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The failure of this check only results in a security mitigation being
applied, slightly affecting performance of the compiled BPF program. It
doesn't result in a failed syscall, an thus auditing a failed LSM
permission check for it is unwanted. For example with SELinux, it causes
a denial to be reported for confined processes running as root, which
tends to be flagged as a problem to be fixed in the policy. Yet
dontauditing or allowing CAP_SYS_ADMIN to the domain may not be
desirable, as it would allow/silence also other checks - either going
against the principle of least privilege or making debugging potentially
harder.
Fix it by changing it from capable() to ns_capable_noaudit(), which
instructs the LSMs to not audit the resulting denials.
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2369326
Fixes:
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|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| Makefile | ||
| bpf_jit_comp.c | ||
| bpf_jit_comp32.c | ||
| bpf_timed_may_goto.S | ||