mirror of https://github.com/torvalds/linux.git
64 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)
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9bfc4824fd |
x86/module: prepare module loading for ROX allocations of text
When module text memory will be allocated with ROX permissions, the memory at the actual address where the module will live will contain invalid instructions and there will be a writable copy that contains the actual module code. Update relocations and alternatives patching to deal with it. [rppt@kernel.org: fix writable address in cfi_rewrite_endbr()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ZysRwR29Ji8CcbXc@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241023162711.2579610-7-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: kdevops <kdevops@lists.linux.dev> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Andreas Larsson <andreas@gaisler.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Cain <bcain@quicinc.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de> Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev> Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com> Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> |
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Mike Rapoport (IBM)
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0cc2dc4902 |
arch: make execmem setup available regardless of CONFIG_MODULES
execmem does not depend on modules, on the contrary modules use execmem. To make execmem available when CONFIG_MODULES=n, for instance for kprobes, split execmem_params initialization out from arch/*/kernel/module.c and compile it when CONFIG_EXECMEM=y Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> |
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Mike Rapoport (IBM)
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223b5e57d0 |
mm/execmem, arch: convert remaining overrides of module_alloc to execmem
Extend execmem parameters to accommodate more complex overrides of module_alloc() by architectures. This includes specification of a fallback range required by arm, arm64 and powerpc, EXECMEM_MODULE_DATA type required by powerpc, support for allocation of KASAN shadow required by s390 and x86 and support for late initialization of execmem required by arm64. The core implementation of execmem_alloc() takes care of suppressing warnings when the initial allocation fails but there is a fallback range defined. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Tested-by: Liviu Dudau <liviu@dudau.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> |
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Juergen Gross
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60bc276b12 |
x86/paravirt: Switch mixed paravirt/alternative calls to alternatives
Instead of stacking alternative and paravirt patching, use the new ALT_FLAG_CALL flag to switch those mixed calls to pure alternative handling. Eliminate the need to be careful regarding the sequence of alternative and paravirt patching. [ bp: Touch up commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231210062138.2417-5-jgross@suse.com |
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Peter Zijlstra
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be0fffa5ca |
x86/alternative: Rename apply_ibt_endbr()
The current name doesn't reflect what it does very well. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230622144321.427441595%40infradead.org |
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Song Liu
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ac3b432839 |
module: replace module_layout with module_memory
module_layout manages different types of memory (text, data, rodata, etc.)
in one allocation, which is problematic for some reasons:
1. It is hard to enable CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX.
2. It is hard to use huge pages in modules (and not break strict rwx).
3. Many archs uses module_layout for arch-specific data, but it is not
obvious how these data are used (are they RO, RX, or RW?)
Improve the scenario by replacing 2 (or 3) module_layout per module with
up to 7 module_memory per module:
MOD_TEXT,
MOD_DATA,
MOD_RODATA,
MOD_RO_AFTER_INIT,
MOD_INIT_TEXT,
MOD_INIT_DATA,
MOD_INIT_RODATA,
and allocating them separately. This adds slightly more entries to
mod_tree (from up to 3 entries per module, to up to 7 entries per
module). However, this at most adds a small constant overhead to
__module_address(), which is expected to be fast.
Various archs use module_layout for different data. These data are put
into different module_memory based on their location in module_layout.
IOW, data that used to go with text is allocated with MOD_MEM_TYPE_TEXT;
data that used to go with data is allocated with MOD_MEM_TYPE_DATA, etc.
module_memory simplifies quite some of the module code. For example,
ARCH_WANTS_MODULES_DATA_IN_VMALLOC is a lot cleaner, as it just uses a
different allocator for the data. kernel/module/strict_rwx.c is also
much cleaner with module_memory.
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
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Linus Torvalds
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7dd86cf801 |
Livepatching changes for 6.3
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Song Liu
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0c05e7bd2d |
livepatch,x86: Clear relocation targets on a module removal
Josh reported a bug:
When the object to be patched is a module, and that module is
rmmod'ed and reloaded, it fails to load with:
module: x86/modules: Skipping invalid relocation target, existing value is nonzero for type 2, loc 00000000ba0302e9, val ffffffffa03e293c
livepatch: failed to initialize patch 'livepatch_nfsd' for module 'nfsd' (-8)
livepatch: patch 'livepatch_nfsd' failed for module 'nfsd', refusing to load module 'nfsd'
The livepatch module has a relocation which references a symbol
in the _previous_ loading of nfsd. When apply_relocate_add()
tries to replace the old relocation with a new one, it sees that
the previous one is nonzero and it errors out.
He also proposed three different solutions. We could remove the error
check in apply_relocate_add() introduced by commit
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Song Liu
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bbb93362a4 |
x86/module: remove unused code in __apply_relocate_add
This "#if 0" block has been untouched for many years. Remove it to clean up the code. Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125185401.279042-1-song@kernel.org |
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Linus Torvalds
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94a855111e |
- Add the call depth tracking mitigation for Retbleed which has
been long in the making. It is a lighterweight software-only fix for Skylake-based cores where enabling IBRS is a big hammer and causes a significant performance impact. What it basically does is, it aligns all kernel functions to 16 bytes boundary and adds a 16-byte padding before the function, objtool collects all functions' locations and when the mitigation gets applied, it patches a call accounting thunk which is used to track the call depth of the stack at any time. When that call depth reaches a magical, microarchitecture-specific value for the Return Stack Buffer, the code stuffs that RSB and avoids its underflow which could otherwise lead to the Intel variant of Retbleed. This software-only solution brings a lot of the lost performance back, as benchmarks suggest: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220915111039.092790446@infradead.org/ That page above also contains a lot more detailed explanation of the whole mechanism - Implement a new control flow integrity scheme called FineIBT which is based on the software kCFI implementation and uses hardware IBT support where present to annotate and track indirect branches using a hash to validate them - Other misc fixes and cleanups -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmOZp5EACgkQEsHwGGHe VUrZFxAAvi/+8L0IYSK4mKJvixGbTFjxN/Swo2JVOfs34LqGUT6JaBc+VUMwZxdb VMTFIZ3ttkKEodjhxGI7oGev6V8UfhI37SmO2lYKXpQVjXXnMlv/M+Vw3teE38CN gopi+xtGnT1IeWQ3tc/Tv18pleJ0mh5HKWiW+9KoqgXj0wgF9x4eRYDz1TDCDA/A iaBzs56j8m/FSykZHnrWZ/MvjKNPdGlfJASUCPeTM2dcrXQGJ93+X2hJctzDte0y Nuiw6Y0htfFBE7xoJn+sqm5Okr+McoUM18/CCprbgSKYk18iMYm3ZtAi6FUQZS1A ua4wQCf49loGp15PO61AS5d3OBf5D3q/WihQRbCaJvTVgPp9sWYnWwtcVUuhMllh ZQtBU9REcVJ/22bH09Q9CjBW0VpKpXHveqQdqRDViLJ6v/iI6EFGmD24SW/VxyRd 73k9MBGrL/dOf1SbEzdsnvcSB3LGzp0Om8o/KzJWOomrVKjBCJy16bwTEsCZEJmP i406m92GPXeaN1GhTko7vmF0GnkEdJs1GVCZPluCAxxbhHukyxHnrjlQjI4vC80n Ylc0B3Kvitw7LGJsPqu+/jfNHADC/zhx1qz/30wb5cFmFbN1aRdp3pm8JYUkn+l/ zri2Y6+O89gvE/9/xUhMohzHsWUO7xITiBavewKeTP9GSWybWUs= =cRy1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_core_for_v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 core updates from Borislav Petkov: - Add the call depth tracking mitigation for Retbleed which has been long in the making. It is a lighterweight software-only fix for Skylake-based cores where enabling IBRS is a big hammer and causes a significant performance impact. What it basically does is, it aligns all kernel functions to 16 bytes boundary and adds a 16-byte padding before the function, objtool collects all functions' locations and when the mitigation gets applied, it patches a call accounting thunk which is used to track the call depth of the stack at any time. When that call depth reaches a magical, microarchitecture-specific value for the Return Stack Buffer, the code stuffs that RSB and avoids its underflow which could otherwise lead to the Intel variant of Retbleed. This software-only solution brings a lot of the lost performance back, as benchmarks suggest: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220915111039.092790446@infradead.org/ That page above also contains a lot more detailed explanation of the whole mechanism - Implement a new control flow integrity scheme called FineIBT which is based on the software kCFI implementation and uses hardware IBT support where present to annotate and track indirect branches using a hash to validate them - Other misc fixes and cleanups * tag 'x86_core_for_v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (80 commits) x86/paravirt: Use common macro for creating simple asm paravirt functions x86/paravirt: Remove clobber bitmask from .parainstructions x86/debug: Include percpu.h in debugreg.h to get DECLARE_PER_CPU() et al x86/cpufeatures: Move X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH from bit 18 to bit 19 of word 11, to leave space for WIP X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA bit x86/Kconfig: Enable kernel IBT by default x86,pm: Force out-of-line memcpy() objtool: Fix weak hole vs prefix symbol objtool: Optimize elf_dirty_reloc_sym() x86/cfi: Add boot time hash randomization x86/cfi: Boot time selection of CFI scheme x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT objtool: Add --cfi to generate the .cfi_sites section x86: Add prefix symbols for function padding objtool: Add option to generate prefix symbols objtool: Avoid O(bloody terrible) behaviour -- an ode to libelf objtool: Slice up elf_create_section_symbol() kallsyms: Revert "Take callthunks into account" x86: Unconfuse CONFIG_ and X86_FEATURE_ namespaces x86/retpoline: Fix crash printing warning x86/paravirt: Fix a !PARAVIRT build warning ... |
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Linus Torvalds
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268325bda5 |
Random number generator updates for Linux 6.2-rc1.
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Merge tag 'random-6.2-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random
Pull random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld:
- Replace prandom_u32_max() and various open-coded variants of it,
there is now a new family of functions that uses fast rejection
sampling to choose properly uniformly random numbers within an
interval:
get_random_u32_below(ceil) - [0, ceil)
get_random_u32_above(floor) - (floor, U32_MAX]
get_random_u32_inclusive(floor, ceil) - [floor, ceil]
Coccinelle was used to convert all current users of
prandom_u32_max(), as well as many open-coded patterns, resulting in
improvements throughout the tree.
I'll have a "late" 6.1-rc1 pull for you that removes the now unused
prandom_u32_max() function, just in case any other trees add a new
use case of it that needs to converted. According to linux-next,
there may be two trivial cases of prandom_u32_max() reintroductions
that are fixable with a 's/.../.../'. So I'll have for you a final
conversion patch doing that alongside the removal patch during the
second week.
This is a treewide change that touches many files throughout.
- More consistent use of get_random_canary().
- Updates to comments, documentation, tests, headers, and
simplification in configuration.
- The arch_get_random*_early() abstraction was only used by arm64 and
wasn't entirely useful, so this has been replaced by code that works
in all relevant contexts.
- The kernel will use and manage random seeds in non-volatile EFI
variables, refreshing a variable with a fresh seed when the RNG is
initialized. The RNG GUID namespace is then hidden from efivarfs to
prevent accidental leakage.
These changes are split into random.c infrastructure code used in the
EFI subsystem, in this pull request, and related support inside of
EFISTUB, in Ard's EFI tree. These are co-dependent for full
functionality, but the order of merging doesn't matter.
- Part of the infrastructure added for the EFI support is also used for
an improvement to the way vsprintf initializes its siphash key,
replacing an sleep loop wart.
- The hardware RNG framework now always calls its correct random.c
input function, add_hwgenerator_randomness(), rather than sometimes
going through helpers better suited for other cases.
- The add_latent_entropy() function has long been called from the fork
handler, but is a no-op when the latent entropy gcc plugin isn't
used, which is fine for the purposes of latent entropy.
But it was missing out on the cycle counter that was also being mixed
in beside the latent entropy variable. So now, if the latent entropy
gcc plugin isn't enabled, add_latent_entropy() will expand to a call
to add_device_randomness(NULL, 0), which adds a cycle counter,
without the absent latent entropy variable.
- The RNG is now reseeded from a delayed worker, rather than on demand
when used. Always running from a worker allows it to make use of the
CPU RNG on platforms like S390x, whose instructions are too slow to
do so from interrupts. It also has the effect of adding in new inputs
more frequently with more regularity, amounting to a long term
transcript of random values. Plus, it helps a bit with the upcoming
vDSO implementation (which isn't yet ready for 6.2).
- The jitter entropy algorithm now tries to execute on many different
CPUs, round-robining, in hopes of hitting even more memory latencies
and other unpredictable effects. It also will mix in a cycle counter
when the entropy timer fires, in addition to being mixed in from the
main loop, to account more explicitly for fluctuations in that timer
firing. And the state it touches is now kept within the same cache
line, so that it's assured that the different execution contexts will
cause latencies.
* tag 'random-6.2-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random: (23 commits)
random: include <linux/once.h> in the right header
random: align entropy_timer_state to cache line
random: mix in cycle counter when jitter timer fires
random: spread out jitter callback to different CPUs
random: remove extraneous period and add a missing one in comments
efi: random: refresh non-volatile random seed when RNG is initialized
vsprintf: initialize siphash key using notifier
random: add back async readiness notifier
random: reseed in delayed work rather than on-demand
random: always mix cycle counter in add_latent_entropy()
hw_random: use add_hwgenerator_randomness() for early entropy
random: modernize documentation comment on get_random_bytes()
random: adjust comment to account for removed function
random: remove early archrandom abstraction
random: use random.trust_{bootloader,cpu} command line option only
stackprotector: actually use get_random_canary()
stackprotector: move get_random_canary() into stackprotector.h
treewide: use get_random_u32_inclusive() when possible
treewide: use get_random_u32_{above,below}() instead of manual loop
treewide: use get_random_u32_below() instead of deprecated function
...
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Julian Pidancet
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be84d8ed3f |
x86/alternative: Consistently patch SMP locks in vmlinux and modules
alternatives_smp_module_add() restricts patching of SMP lock prefixes to the text address range passed as an argument. For vmlinux, patching all the instructions located between the _text and _etext symbols is allowed. That includes the .text section but also other sections such as .text.hot and .text.unlikely. As per the comment inside the 'struct smp_alt_module' definition, the original purpose of this restriction is to avoid patching the init code because in the case when one boots with a single CPU, the LOCK prefixes to the locking primitives are removed. Later on, when other CPUs are onlined, those LOCK prefixes get added back in but by that time the .init code is very likely removed so patching that would be a bad idea. For modules, the current code only allows patching instructions located inside the .text segment, excluding other sections such as .text.hot or .text.unlikely, which may need patching. Make patching of the kernel core and modules more consistent by allowing all text sections of modules except .init.text to be patched in module_finalize(). For that, use mod->core_layout.base/mod->core_layout.text_size as the address range allowed to be patched, which include all the code sections except the init code. [ bp: Massage and expand commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Julian Pidancet <julian.pidancet@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221027204906.511277-1-julian.pidancet@oracle.com |
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Jason A. Donenfeld
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e8a533cbeb |
treewide: use get_random_u32_inclusive() when possible
These cases were done with this Coccinelle: @@ expression H; expression L; @@ - (get_random_u32_below(H) + L) + get_random_u32_inclusive(L, H + L - 1) @@ expression H; expression L; expression E; @@ get_random_u32_inclusive(L, H - + E - - E ) @@ expression H; expression L; expression E; @@ get_random_u32_inclusive(L, H - - E - + E ) @@ expression H; expression L; expression E; expression F; @@ get_random_u32_inclusive(L, H - - E + F - + E ) @@ expression H; expression L; expression E; expression F; @@ get_random_u32_inclusive(L, H - + E + F - - E ) And then subsequently cleaned up by hand, with several automatic cases rejected if it didn't make sense contextually. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> # for infiniband Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> |
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Jason A. Donenfeld
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8032bf1233 |
treewide: use get_random_u32_below() instead of deprecated function
This is a simple mechanical transformation done by: @@ expression E; @@ - prandom_u32_max + get_random_u32_below (E) Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> # for xfs Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> # for damon Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> # for infiniband Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> # for arm Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # for mmc Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> |
|
|
Peter Zijlstra
|
931ab63664 |
x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT
Implement an alternative CFI scheme that merges both the fine-grained
nature of kCFI but also takes full advantage of the coarse grained
hardware CFI as provided by IBT.
To contrast:
kCFI is a pure software CFI scheme and relies on being able to read
text -- specifically the instruction *before* the target symbol, and
does the hash validation *before* doing the call (otherwise control
flow is compromised already).
FineIBT is a software and hardware hybrid scheme; by ensuring every
branch target starts with a hash validation it is possible to place
the hash validation after the branch. This has several advantages:
o the (hash) load is avoided; no memop; no RX requirement.
o IBT WAIT-FOR-ENDBR state is a speculation stop; by placing
the hash validation in the immediate instruction after
the branch target there is a minimal speculation window
and the whole is a viable defence against SpectreBHB.
o Kees feels obliged to mention it is slightly more vulnerable
when the attacker can write code.
Obviously this patch relies on kCFI, but additionally it also relies
on the padding from the call-depth-tracking patches. It uses this
padding to place the hash-validation while the call-sites are
re-written to modify the indirect target to be 16 bytes in front of
the original target, thus hitting this new preamble.
Notably, there is no hardware that needs call-depth-tracking (Skylake)
and supports IBT (Tigerlake and onwards).
Suggested-by: Joao Moreira (Intel) <joao@overdrivepizza.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221027092842.634714496@infradead.org
|
|
Thomas Gleixner
|
eaf44c816e |
x86/modules: Add call patching
As for the builtins create call thunks and patch the call sites to call the thunk on Intel SKL CPUs for retbleed mitigation. Note, that module init functions are ignored for sake of simplicity because loading modules is not something which is done in high frequent loops and the attacker has not really a handle on when this happens in order to launch a matching attack. The depth tracking will still work for calls into the builtins and because the call is not accounted it will underflow faster and overstuff, but that's mitigated by the saturating counter and the side effect is only temporary. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220915111147.575673066@infradead.org |
|
|
Thomas Gleixner
|
4c4eb3ecc9 |
x86/modules: Set VM_FLUSH_RESET_PERMS in module_alloc()
Instead of resetting permissions all over the place when freeing module memory tell the vmalloc code to do so. Avoids the exercise for the next upcoming user. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220915111143.406703869@infradead.org |
|
|
Jason A. Donenfeld
|
81895a65ec |
treewide: use prandom_u32_max() when possible, part 1
Rather than incurring a division or requesting too many random bytes for
the given range, use the prandom_u32_max() function, which only takes
the minimum required bytes from the RNG and avoids divisions. This was
done mechanically with this coccinelle script:
@basic@
expression E;
type T;
identifier get_random_u32 =~ "get_random_int|prandom_u32|get_random_u32";
typedef u64;
@@
(
- ((T)get_random_u32() % (E))
+ prandom_u32_max(E)
|
- ((T)get_random_u32() & ((E) - 1))
+ prandom_u32_max(E * XXX_MAKE_SURE_E_IS_POW2)
|
- ((u64)(E) * get_random_u32() >> 32)
+ prandom_u32_max(E)
|
- ((T)get_random_u32() & ~PAGE_MASK)
+ prandom_u32_max(PAGE_SIZE)
)
@multi_line@
identifier get_random_u32 =~ "get_random_int|prandom_u32|get_random_u32";
identifier RAND;
expression E;
@@
- RAND = get_random_u32();
... when != RAND
- RAND %= (E);
+ RAND = prandom_u32_max(E);
// Find a potential literal
@literal_mask@
expression LITERAL;
type T;
identifier get_random_u32 =~ "get_random_int|prandom_u32|get_random_u32";
position p;
@@
((T)get_random_u32()@p & (LITERAL))
// Add one to the literal.
@script:python add_one@
literal << literal_mask.LITERAL;
RESULT;
@@
value = None
if literal.startswith('0x'):
value = int(literal, 16)
elif literal[0] in '123456789':
value = int(literal, 10)
if value is None:
print("I don't know how to handle %s" % (literal))
cocci.include_match(False)
elif value == 2**32 - 1 or value == 2**31 - 1 or value == 2**24 - 1 or value == 2**16 - 1 or value == 2**8 - 1:
print("Skipping 0x%x for cleanup elsewhere" % (value))
cocci.include_match(False)
elif value & (value + 1) != 0:
print("Skipping 0x%x because it's not a power of two minus one" % (value))
cocci.include_match(False)
elif literal.startswith('0x'):
coccinelle.RESULT = cocci.make_expr("0x%x" % (value + 1))
else:
coccinelle.RESULT = cocci.make_expr("%d" % (value + 1))
// Replace the literal mask with the calculated result.
@plus_one@
expression literal_mask.LITERAL;
position literal_mask.p;
expression add_one.RESULT;
identifier FUNC;
@@
- (FUNC()@p & (LITERAL))
+ prandom_u32_max(RESULT)
@collapse_ret@
type T;
identifier VAR;
expression E;
@@
{
- T VAR;
- VAR = (E);
- return VAR;
+ return E;
}
@drop_var@
type T;
identifier VAR;
@@
{
- T VAR;
... when != VAR
}
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> # for ext4 and sbitmap
Reviewed-by: Christoph Böhmwalder <christoph.boehmwalder@linbit.com> # for drbd
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> # for s390
Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # for mmc
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> # for xfs
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
|
|
|
Linus Torvalds
|
22a39c3d86 |
This was a fairly quiet cycle for the locking subsystem:
- lockdep: Fix a handful of the more complex lockdep_init_map_*() primitives
that can lose the lock_type & cause false reports. No such mishap was
observed in the wild.
- jump_label improvements: simplify the cross-arch support of
initial NOP patching by making it arch-specific code (used on MIPS only),
and remove the s390 initial NOP patching that was superfluous.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'locking-core-2022-08-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull locking updates from Ingo Molnar:
"This was a fairly quiet cycle for the locking subsystem:
- lockdep: Fix a handful of the more complex lockdep_init_map_*()
primitives that can lose the lock_type & cause false reports. No
such mishap was observed in the wild.
- jump_label improvements: simplify the cross-arch support of initial
NOP patching by making it arch-specific code (used on MIPS only),
and remove the s390 initial NOP patching that was superfluous"
* tag 'locking-core-2022-08-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
locking/lockdep: Fix lockdep_init_map_*() confusion
jump_label: make initial NOP patching the special case
jump_label: mips: move module NOP patching into arch code
jump_label: s390: avoid pointless initial NOP patching
|
|
|
Peter Zijlstra
|
15e67227c4 |
x86: Undo return-thunk damage
Introduce X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK for those afflicted with needing this. [ bp: Do only INT3 padding - simpler. ] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> |
|
Ard Biesheuvel
|
fdfd42892f |
jump_label: mips: move module NOP patching into arch code
MIPS is the only remaining architecture that needs to patch jump label NOP encodings to initialize them at load time. So let's move the module patching part of that from generic code into arch/mips, and drop it from the others. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220615154142.1574619-3-ardb@kernel.org |
|
|
Linus Torvalds
|
7001052160 |
Add support for Intel CET-IBT, available since Tigerlake (11th gen), which is a
coarse grained, hardware based, forward edge Control-Flow-Integrity mechanism where any indirect CALL/JMP must target an ENDBR instruction or suffer #CP. Additionally, since Alderlake (12th gen)/Sapphire-Rapids, speculation is limited to 2 instructions (and typically fewer) on branch targets not starting with ENDBR. CET-IBT also limits speculation of the next sequential instruction after the indirect CALL/JMP [1]. CET-IBT is fundamentally incompatible with retpolines, but provides, as described above, speculation limits itself. [1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJJBAABCgAzFiEEv3OU3/byMaA0LqWJdkfhpEvA5LoFAmI/LI8VHHBldGVyekBp bmZyYWRlYWQub3JnAAoJEHZH4aRLwOS6ZnkP/2QCgQLTu6oRxv9O020CHwlaSEeD 1Hoy3loum5q5hAi1Ik3dR9p0H5u64c9qbrBVxaFoNKaLt5GKrtHaDSHNk2L/CFHX urpH65uvTLxbyZzcahkAahoJ71XU+m7PcrHLWMunw9sy10rExYVsUOlFyoyG6XCF BDCNZpdkC09ZM3vwlWGMZd5Pp+6HcZNPyoV9tpvWAS2l+WYFWAID7mflbpQ+tA8b y/hM6b3Ud0rT2ubuG1iUpopgNdwqQZ+HisMPGprh+wKZkYwS2l8pUTrz0MaBkFde go7fW16kFy2HQzGm6aIEBmfcg0palP/mFVaWP0zS62LwhJSWTn5G6xWBr3yxSsht 9gWCiI0oDZuTg698MedWmomdG2SK6yAuZuqmdKtLLoWfWgviPEi7TDFG/cKtZdAW ag8GM8T4iyYZzpCEcWO9GWbjo6TTGq30JBQefCBG47GjD0csv2ubXXx0Iey+jOwT x3E8wnv9dl8V9FSd/tMpTFmje8ges23yGrWtNpb5BRBuWTeuGiBPZED2BNyyIf+T dmewi2ufNMONgyNp27bDKopY81CPAQq9cVxqNm9Cg3eWPFnpOq2KGYEvisZ/rpEL EjMQeUBsy/C3AUFAleu1vwNnkwP/7JfKYpN00gnSyeQNZpqwxXBCKnHNgOMTXyJz beB/7u2KIUbKEkSN =jZfK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 CET-IBT (Control-Flow-Integrity) support from Peter Zijlstra: "Add support for Intel CET-IBT, available since Tigerlake (11th gen), which is a coarse grained, hardware based, forward edge Control-Flow-Integrity mechanism where any indirect CALL/JMP must target an ENDBR instruction or suffer #CP. Additionally, since Alderlake (12th gen)/Sapphire-Rapids, speculation is limited to 2 instructions (and typically fewer) on branch targets not starting with ENDBR. CET-IBT also limits speculation of the next sequential instruction after the indirect CALL/JMP [1]. CET-IBT is fundamentally incompatible with retpolines, but provides, as described above, speculation limits itself" [1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html * tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (53 commits) kvm/emulate: Fix SETcc emulation for ENDBR x86/Kconfig: Only allow CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT with ld.lld >= 14.0.0 x86/Kconfig: Only enable CONFIG_CC_HAS_IBT for clang >= 14.0.0 kbuild: Fixup the IBT kbuild changes x86/Kconfig: Do not allow CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y with llvm-objcopy x86: Remove toolchain check for X32 ABI capability x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls objtool: Find unused ENDBR instructions objtool: Validate IBT assumptions objtool: Add IBT/ENDBR decoding objtool: Read the NOENDBR annotation x86: Annotate idtentry_df() x86,objtool: Move the ASM_REACHABLE annotation to objtool.h x86: Annotate call_on_stack() objtool: Rework ASM_REACHABLE x86: Mark __invalid_creds() __noreturn exit: Mark do_group_exit() __noreturn x86: Mark stop_this_cpu() __noreturn objtool: Ignore extra-symbol code objtool: Rename --duplicate to --lto ... |
|
Andrey Konovalov
|
63840de296 |
kasan, x86, arm64, s390: rename functions for modules shadow
Rename kasan_free_shadow to kasan_free_module_shadow and kasan_module_alloc to kasan_alloc_module_shadow. These functions are used to allocate/free shadow memory for kernel modules when KASAN_VMALLOC is not enabled. The new names better reflect their purpose. Also reword the comment next to their declaration to improve clarity. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/36db32bde765d5d0b856f77d2d806e838513fe84.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
|
|
Peter Zijlstra
|
ed53a0d971 |
x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls
Objtool's --ibt option generates .ibt_endbr_seal which lists superfluous ENDBR instructions. That is those instructions for which the function is never indirectly called. Overwrite these ENDBR instructions with a NOP4 such that these function can never be indirect called, reducing the number of viable ENDBR targets in the kernel. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308154319.822545231@infradead.org |
|
|
Peter Zijlstra
|
5adf349439 |
x86/module: Fix the paravirt vs alternative order
Ever since commit |
|
Kefeng Wang
|
60115fa54a |
mm: defer kmemleak object creation of module_alloc()
Yongqiang reports a kmemleak panic when module insmod/rmmod with KASAN
enabled(without KASAN_VMALLOC) on x86[1].
When the module area allocates memory, it's kmemleak_object is created
successfully, but the KASAN shadow memory of module allocation is not
ready, so when kmemleak scan the module's pointer, it will panic due to
no shadow memory with KASAN check.
module_alloc
__vmalloc_node_range
kmemleak_vmalloc
kmemleak_scan
update_checksum
kasan_module_alloc
kmemleak_ignore
Note, there is no problem if KASAN_VMALLOC enabled, the modules area
entire shadow memory is preallocated. Thus, the bug only exits on ARCH
which supports dynamic allocation of module area per module load, for
now, only x86/arm64/s390 are involved.
Add a VM_DEFER_KMEMLEAK flags, defer vmalloc'ed object register of
kmemleak in module_alloc() to fix this issue.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/6d41e2b9-4692-5ec4-b1cd-cbe29ae89739@huawei.com/
[wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com: fix build]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211125080307.27225-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: simplify ifdefs, per Andrey]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+fCnZcnwJHUQq34VuRxpdoY6_XbJCDJ-jopksS5Eia4PijPzw@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211124142034.192078-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Fixes:
|
|
|
Peter Zijlstra
|
7508500900 |
x86/alternative: Implement .retpoline_sites support
Rewrite retpoline thunk call sites to be indirect calls for spectre_v2=off. This ensures spectre_v2=off is as near to a RETPOLINE=n build as possible. This is the replacement for objtool writing alternative entries to ensure the same and achieves feature-parity with the previous approach. One noteworthy feature is that it relies on the thunks to be in machine order to compute the register index. Specifically, this does not yet address the Jcc __x86_indirect_thunk_* calls generated by clang, a future patch will add this. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.232495794@infradead.org |
|
Fangrui Song
|
bb73d07148 |
x86/build: Treat R_386_PLT32 relocation as R_386_PC32
This is similar to commit |
|
Mike Rapoport
|
e31cf2f4ca |
mm: don't include asm/pgtable.h if linux/mm.h is already included
Patch series "mm: consolidate definitions of page table accessors", v2.
The low level page table accessors (pXY_index(), pXY_offset()) are
duplicated across all architectures and sometimes more than once. For
instance, we have 31 definition of pgd_offset() for 25 supported
architectures.
Most of these definitions are actually identical and typically it boils
down to, e.g.
static inline unsigned long pmd_index(unsigned long address)
{
return (address >> PMD_SHIFT) & (PTRS_PER_PMD - 1);
}
static inline pmd_t *pmd_offset(pud_t *pud, unsigned long address)
{
return (pmd_t *)pud_page_vaddr(*pud) + pmd_index(address);
}
These definitions can be shared among 90% of the arches provided
XYZ_SHIFT, PTRS_PER_XYZ and xyz_page_vaddr() are defined.
For architectures that really need a custom version there is always
possibility to override the generic version with the usual ifdefs magic.
These patches introduce include/linux/pgtable.h that replaces
include/asm-generic/pgtable.h and add the definitions of the page table
accessors to the new header.
This patch (of 12):
The linux/mm.h header includes <asm/pgtable.h> to allow inlining of the
functions involving page table manipulations, e.g. pte_alloc() and
pmd_alloc(). So, there is no point to explicitly include <asm/pgtable.h>
in the files that include <linux/mm.h>.
The include statements in such cases are remove with a simple loop:
for f in $(git grep -l "include <linux/mm.h>") ; do
sed -i -e '/include <asm\/pgtable.h>/ d' $f
done
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Cain <bcain@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ley Foon Tan <ley.foon.tan@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vincent Chen <deanbo422@gmail.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200514170327.31389-1-rppt@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200514170327.31389-2-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Josh Poimboeuf
|
5b384f9335 |
x86/module: Use text_mutex in apply_relocate_add()
Now that the livepatch code no longer needs the text_mutex for changing module permissions, move its usage down to apply_relocate_add(). Note the s390 version of apply_relocate_add() doesn't need to use the text_mutex because it already uses s390_kernel_write_lock, which accomplishes the same task. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com> Acked-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> |
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Peter Zijlstra
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88fc078a7a |
x86/module: Use text_poke() for late relocations
Because of late module patching, a livepatch module needs to be able to
apply some of its relocations well after it has been loaded. Instead of
playing games with module_{dis,en}able_ro(), use existing text poking
mechanisms to apply relocations after module loading.
So far only x86, s390 and Power have HAVE_LIVEPATCH but only the first
two also have STRICT_MODULE_RWX.
This will allow removal of the last module_disable_ro() usage in
livepatch. The ultimate goal is to completely disallow making
executable mappings writable.
[ jpoimboe: Split up patches. Use mod state to determine whether
memcpy() can be used. Implement text_poke() for UML. ]
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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|
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Thomas Gleixner
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1a59d1b8e0 |
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 156
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version this program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along with this program if not write to the free software foundation inc 59 temple place suite 330 boston ma 02111 1307 usa extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1334 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070033.113240726@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
|
Nadav Amit
|
f2c65fb322 |
x86/modules: Avoid breaking W^X while loading modules
When modules and BPF filters are loaded, there is a time window in which some memory is both writable and executable. An attacker that has already found another vulnerability (e.g., a dangling pointer) might be able to exploit this behavior to overwrite kernel code. Prevent having writable executable PTEs in this stage. In addition, avoiding having W+X mappings can also slightly simplify the patching of modules code on initialization (e.g., by alternatives and static-key), as would be done in the next patch. This was actually the main motivation for this patch. To avoid having W+X mappings, set them initially as RW (NX) and after they are set as RO set them as X as well. Setting them as executable is done as a separate step to avoid one core in which the old PTE is cached (hence writable), and another which sees the updated PTE (executable), which would break the W^X protection. Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com> Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com> Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com> Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-12-namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
|
Ard Biesheuvel
|
b40a142b12 |
x86: Add support for 64-bit place relative relocations
Add support for R_X86_64_PC64 relocations, which operate on 64-bit quantities holding a relative symbol reference. Also remove the definition of R_X86_64_NUM: given that it is currently unused, it is unclear what the new value should be. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180919065144.25010-5-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org |
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H.J. Lu
|
b21ebf2fb4 |
x86: Treat R_X86_64_PLT32 as R_X86_64_PC32
On i386, there are 2 types of PLTs, PIC and non-PIC. PIE and shared
objects must use PIC PLT. To use PIC PLT, you need to load
_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ into EBX first. There is no need for that on
x86-64 since x86-64 uses PC-relative PLT.
On x86-64, for 32-bit PC-relative branches, we can generate PLT32
relocation, instead of PC32 relocation, which can also be used as
a marker for 32-bit PC-relative branches. Linker can always reduce
PLT32 relocation to PC32 if function is defined locally. Local
functions should use PC32 relocation. As far as Linux kernel is
concerned, R_X86_64_PLT32 can be treated the same as R_X86_64_PC32
since Linux kernel doesn't use PLT.
R_X86_64_PLT32 for 32-bit PC-relative branches has been enabled in
binutils master branch which will become binutils 2.31.
[ hjl is working on having better documentation on this all, but a few
more notes from him:
"PLT32 relocation is used as marker for PC-relative branches. Because
of EBX, it looks odd to generate PLT32 relocation on i386 when EBX
doesn't have GOT.
As for symbol resolution, PLT32 and PC32 relocations are almost
interchangeable. But when linker sees PLT32 relocation against a
protected symbol, it can resolved locally at link-time since it is
used on a branch instruction. Linker can't do that for PC32
relocation"
but for the kernel use, the two are basically the same, and this
commit gets things building and working with the current binutils
master - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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|
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Josh Poimboeuf
|
eda9cec4c9 |
x86/module: Detect and skip invalid relocations
There have been some cases where external tooling (e.g., kpatch-build) creates a corrupt relocation which targets the wrong address. This is a silent failure which can corrupt memory in unexpected places. On x86, the bytes of data being overwritten by relocations are always initialized to zero beforehand. Use that knowledge to add sanity checks to detect such cases before they corrupt memory. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: jeyu@kernel.org Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/37450d6c6225e54db107fba447ce9e56e5f758e9.1509713553.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com [ Restructured the messages, as it's unclear whether the relocation or the target is corrupted. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
|
|
Josh Poimboeuf
|
ee9f8fce99 |
x86/unwind: Add the ORC unwinder
Add the new ORC unwinder which is enabled by CONFIG_ORC_UNWINDER=y. It plugs into the existing x86 unwinder framework. It relies on objtool to generate the needed .orc_unwind and .orc_unwind_ip sections. For more details on why ORC is used instead of DWARF, see Documentation/x86/orc-unwinder.txt - but the short version is that it's a simplified, fundamentally more robust debugninfo data structure, which also allows up to two orders of magnitude faster lookups than the DWARF unwinder - which matters to profiling workloads like perf. Thanks to Andy Lutomirski for the performance improvement ideas: splitting the ORC unwind table into two parallel arrays and creating a fast lookup table to search a subset of the unwind table. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0a6cbfb40f8da99b7a45a1a8302dc6aef16ec812.1500938583.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com [ Extended the changelog. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
|
Michal Hocko
|
19809c2da2 |
mm, vmalloc: use __GFP_HIGHMEM implicitly
__vmalloc* allows users to provide gfp flags for the underlying allocation. This API is quite popular $ git grep "=[[:space:]]__vmalloc\|return[[:space:]]*__vmalloc" | wc -l 77 The only problem is that many people are not aware that they really want to give __GFP_HIGHMEM along with other flags because there is really no reason to consume precious lowmemory on CONFIG_HIGHMEM systems for pages which are mapped to the kernel vmalloc space. About half of users don't use this flag, though. This signals that we make the API unnecessarily too complex. This patch simply uses __GFP_HIGHMEM implicitly when allocating pages to be mapped to the vmalloc space. Current users which add __GFP_HIGHMEM are simplified and drop the flag. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170307141020.29107-1-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Cristopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
|
Andy Lutomirski
|
35de5b0692 |
x86/asm: Stop depending on ptrace.h in alternative.h
alternative.h pulls in ptrace.h, which means that alternatives can't be used in anything referenced from ptrace.h, which is a mess. Break the dependency by pulling text patching helpers into their own header. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/99b93b13f2c9eb671f5c98bba4c2cbdc061293a2.1461698311.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Borislav Petkov
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78cac48c04 |
x86/mm/KASLR: Propagate KASLR status to kernel proper
Commit: |
|
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Borislav Petkov
|
69797dafe3 |
Revert "x86/mm/ASLR: Propagate base load address calculation"
This reverts commit:
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|
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Linus Torvalds
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5fbe4c224c |
Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull misc x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar: "This contains: - EFI fixes - a boot printout fix - ASLR/kASLR fixes - intel microcode driver fixes - other misc fixes Most of the linecount comes from an EFI revert" * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mm/ASLR: Avoid PAGE_SIZE redefinition for UML subarch x86/microcode/intel: Handle truncated microcode images more robustly x86/microcode/intel: Guard against stack overflow in the loader x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems x86/mm/init: Fix incorrect page size in init_memory_mapping() printks x86/mm/ASLR: Propagate base load address calculation Documentation/x86: Fix path in zero-page.txt x86/apic: Fix the devicetree build in certain configs Revert "efi/libstub: Call get_memory_map() to obtain map and desc sizes" x86/efi: Avoid triple faults during EFI mixed mode calls |
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Jiri Kosina
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570e1aa84c |
x86/mm/ASLR: Avoid PAGE_SIZE redefinition for UML subarch
Commit
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|
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Jiri Kosina
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f47233c2d3 |
x86/mm/ASLR: Propagate base load address calculation
Commit:
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Andrey Ryabinin
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bebf56a1b1 |
kasan: enable instrumentation of global variables
This feature let us to detect accesses out of bounds of global variables. This will work as for globals in kernel image, so for globals in modules. Currently this won't work for symbols in user-specified sections (e.g. __init, __read_mostly, ...) The idea of this is simple. Compiler increases each global variable by redzone size and add constructors invoking __asan_register_globals() function. Information about global variable (address, size, size with redzone ...) passed to __asan_register_globals() so we could poison variable's redzone. This patch also forces module_alloc() to return 8*PAGE_SIZE aligned address making shadow memory handling ( kasan_module_alloc()/kasan_module_free() ) more simple. Such alignment guarantees that each shadow page backing modules address space correspond to only one module_alloc() allocation. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Andrey Ryabinin
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cb9e3c292d |
mm: vmalloc: pass additional vm_flags to __vmalloc_node_range()
For instrumenting global variables KASan will shadow memory backing memory for modules. So on module loading we will need to allocate memory for shadow and map it at address in shadow that corresponds to the address allocated in module_alloc(). __vmalloc_node_range() could be used for this purpose, except it puts a guard hole after allocated area. Guard hole in shadow memory should be a problem because at some future point we might need to have a shadow memory at address occupied by guard hole. So we could fail to allocate shadow for module_alloc(). Now we have VM_NO_GUARD flag disabling guard page, so we need to pass into __vmalloc_node_range(). Add new parameter 'vm_flags' to __vmalloc_node_range() function. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Kees Cook
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9dd721c6db |
x86, kaslr: fix module lock ordering problem
There was a potential lock ordering problem with the module kASLR patch
("x86, kaslr: randomize module base load address"). This patch removes
the usage of the module_mutex and creates a new mutex to protect the
module base address offset value.
Chain exists of:
text_mutex --> kprobe_insn_slots.mutex --> module_mutex
[ 0.515561] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 0.515561]
[ 0.515561] CPU0 CPU1
[ 0.515561] ---- ----
[ 0.515561] lock(module_mutex);
[ 0.515561] lock(kprobe_insn_slots.mutex);
[ 0.515561] lock(module_mutex);
[ 0.515561] lock(text_mutex);
[ 0.515561]
[ 0.515561] *** DEADLOCK ***
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
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|
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Kees Cook
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e2b32e6785 |
x86, kaslr: randomize module base load address
Randomize the load address of modules in the kernel to make kASLR effective for modules. Modules can only be loaded within a particular range of virtual address space. This patch adds 10 bits of entropy to the load address by adding 1-1024 * PAGE_SIZE to the beginning range where modules are loaded. The single base offset was chosen because randomizing each module load ends up wasting/fragmenting memory too much. Prior approaches to minimizing fragmentation while doing randomization tend to result in worse entropy than just doing a single base address offset. Example kASLR boot without this change, with a single module loaded: ---[ Modules ]--- 0xffffffffc0000000-0xffffffffc0001000 4K ro GLB x pte 0xffffffffc0001000-0xffffffffc0002000 4K ro GLB NX pte 0xffffffffc0002000-0xffffffffc0004000 8K RW GLB NX pte 0xffffffffc0004000-0xffffffffc0200000 2032K pte 0xffffffffc0200000-0xffffffffff000000 1006M pmd ---[ End Modules ]--- Example kASLR boot after this change, same module loaded: ---[ Modules ]--- 0xffffffffc0000000-0xffffffffc0200000 2M pmd 0xffffffffc0200000-0xffffffffc03bf000 1788K pte 0xffffffffc03bf000-0xffffffffc03c0000 4K ro GLB x pte 0xffffffffc03c0000-0xffffffffc03c1000 4K ro GLB NX pte 0xffffffffc03c1000-0xffffffffc03c3000 8K RW GLB NX pte 0xffffffffc03c3000-0xffffffffc0400000 244K pte 0xffffffffc0400000-0xffffffffff000000 1004M pmd ---[ End Modules ]--- Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140226005916.GA27083@www.outflux.net Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> |
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Jianguo Wu
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40c3baa7c6 |
mm/arch: use NUMA_NO_NODE
Use more appropriate NUMA_NO_NODE instead of -1 in all archs' module_alloc() Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Linus Torvalds
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d14b7a419a |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial
Pull trivial tree from Jiri Kosina: "Trivial updates all over the place as usual." * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial: (29 commits) Fix typo in include/linux/clk.h . pci: hotplug: Fix typo in pci iommu: Fix typo in iommu video: Fix typo in drivers/video Documentation: Add newline at end-of-file to files lacking one arm,unicore32: Remove obsolete "select MISC_DEVICES" module.c: spelling s/postition/position/g cpufreq: Fix typo in cpufreq driver trivial: typo in comment in mksysmap mach-omap2: Fix typo in debug message and comment scsi: aha152x: Fix sparse warning and make printing pointer address more portable. Change email address for Steve Glendinning Btrfs: fix typo in convert_extent_bit via: Remove bogus if check netprio_cgroup.c: fix comment typo backlight: fix memory leak on obscure error path Documentation: asus-laptop.txt references an obsolete Kconfig item Documentation: ManagementStyle: fixed typo mm/vmscan: cleanup comment error in balance_pgdat mm: cleanup on the comments of zone_reclaim_stat ... |