mirror of https://github.com/torvalds/linux.git
366 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
86bc9c7424 |
bpf: Avoid __bpf_prog_ret0_warn when jit fails
syzkaller reported an issue:
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 217 at kernel/bpf/core.c:2357 __bpf_prog_ret0_warn+0xa/0x20 kernel/bpf/core.c:2357
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/u32:6 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc4-syzkaller-00040-g8bac8898fe39
RIP: 0010:__bpf_prog_ret0_warn+0xa/0x20 kernel/bpf/core.c:2357
Call Trace:
<TASK>
bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1316 [inline]
__bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:718 [inline]
bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:725 [inline]
cls_bpf_classify+0x74a/0x1110 net/sched/cls_bpf.c:105
...
When creating bpf program, 'fp->jit_requested' depends on bpf_jit_enable.
This issue is triggered because of CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON is not set
and bpf_jit_enable is set to 1, causing the arch to attempt JIT the prog,
but jit failed due to FAULT_INJECTION. As a result, incorrectly
treats the program as valid, when the program runs it calls
`__bpf_prog_ret0_warn` and triggers the WARN_ON_ONCE(1).
Reported-by: syzbot+0903f6d7f285e41cdf10@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/6816e34e.a70a0220.254cdc.002c.GAE@google.com
Fixes:
|
|
|
|
714070c4cb |
bpf: Allow XDP dev-bound programs to perform XDP_REDIRECT into maps
In the current implementation if the program is dev-bound to a specific
device, it will not be possible to perform XDP_REDIRECT into a DEVMAP
or CPUMAP even if the program is running in the driver NAPI context and
it is not attached to any map entry. This seems in contrast with the
explanation available in bpf_prog_map_compatible routine.
Fix the issue introducing __bpf_prog_map_compatible utility routine in
order to avoid bpf_prog_is_dev_bound() check running bpf_check_tail_call()
at program load time (bpf_prog_select_runtime()).
Continue forbidding to attach a dev-bound program to XDP maps
(BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY, BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP and BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP).
Fixes:
|
|
|
|
ae0a457f5d |
bpf: Make perf_event_read_output accessible in all program types.
The perf_event_read_event_output helper is currently only available to tracing protrams, but is useful for other BPF programs like sched_ext schedulers. When the helper is available, provide its bpf_func_proto directly from the bpf base_proto. Signed-off-by: Emil Tsalapatis (Meta) <emil@etsalapatis.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250318030753.10949-1-emil@etsalapatis.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
880442305a |
bpf: Introduce load-acquire and store-release instructions
Introduce BPF instructions with load-acquire and store-release
semantics, as discussed in [1]. Define 2 new flags:
#define BPF_LOAD_ACQ 0x100
#define BPF_STORE_REL 0x110
A "load-acquire" is a BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC instruction with the 'imm'
field set to BPF_LOAD_ACQ (0x100).
Similarly, a "store-release" is a BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC instruction with
the 'imm' field set to BPF_STORE_REL (0x110).
Unlike existing atomic read-modify-write operations that only support
BPF_W (32-bit) and BPF_DW (64-bit) size modifiers, load-acquires and
store-releases also support BPF_B (8-bit) and BPF_H (16-bit). As an
exception, however, 64-bit load-acquires/store-releases are not
supported on 32-bit architectures (to fix a build error reported by the
kernel test robot).
An 8- or 16-bit load-acquire zero-extends the value before writing it to
a 32-bit register, just like ARM64 instruction LDARH and friends.
Similar to existing atomic read-modify-write operations, misaligned
load-acquires/store-releases are not allowed (even if
BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT is set).
As an example, consider the following 64-bit load-acquire BPF
instruction (assuming little-endian):
db 10 00 00 00 01 00 00 r0 = load_acquire((u64 *)(r1 + 0x0))
opcode (0xdb): BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_DW | BPF_STX
imm (0x00000100): BPF_LOAD_ACQ
Similarly, a 16-bit BPF store-release:
cb 21 00 00 10 01 00 00 store_release((u16 *)(r1 + 0x0), w2)
opcode (0xcb): BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_H | BPF_STX
imm (0x00000110): BPF_STORE_REL
In arch/{arm64,s390,x86}/net/bpf_jit_comp.c, have
bpf_jit_supports_insn(..., /*in_arena=*/true) return false for the new
instructions, until the corresponding JIT compiler supports them in
arena.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240729183246.4110549-1-yepeilin@google.com/
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a217f46f0e445fbd573a1a024be5c6bf1d5fe716.1741049567.git.yepeilin@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
|
|
e723608bf4 |
bpf: Add verifier support for timed may_goto
Implement support in the verifier for replacing may_goto implementation from a counter-based approach to one which samples time on the local CPU to have a bigger loop bound. We implement it by maintaining 16-bytes per-stack frame, and using 8 bytes for maintaining the count for amortizing time sampling, and 8 bytes for the starting timestamp. To minimize overhead, we need to avoid spilling and filling of registers around this sequence, so we push this cost into the time sampling function 'arch_bpf_timed_may_goto'. This is a JIT-specific wrapper around bpf_check_timed_may_goto which returns us the count to store into the stack through BPF_REG_AX. All caller-saved registers (r0-r5) are guaranteed to remain untouched. The loop can be broken by returning count as 0, otherwise we dispatch into the function when the count drops to 0, and the runtime chooses to refresh it (by returning count as BPF_MAX_TIMED_LOOPS) or returning 0 and aborting the loop on next iteration. Since the check for 0 is done right after loading the count from the stack, all subsequent cond_break sequences should immediately break as well, of the same loop or subsequent loops in the program. We pass in the stack_depth of the count (and thus the timestamp, by adding 8 to it) to the arch_bpf_timed_may_goto call so that it can be passed in to bpf_check_timed_may_goto as an argument after r1 is saved, by adding the offset to r10/fp. This adjustment will be arch specific, and the next patch will introduce support for x86. Note that depending on loop complexity, time spent in the loop can be more than the current limit (250 ms), but imposing an upper bound on program runtime is an orthogonal problem which will be addressed when program cancellations are supported. The current time afforded by cond_break may not be enough for cases where BPF programs want to implement locking algorithms inline, and use cond_break as a promise to the verifier that they will eventually terminate. Below are some benchmarking numbers on the time taken per-iteration for an empty loop that counts the number of iterations until cond_break fires. For comparison, we compare it against bpf_for/bpf_repeat which is another way to achieve the same number of spins (BPF_MAX_LOOPS). The hardware used for benchmarking was a Sapphire Rapids Intel server with performance governor enabled, mitigations were enabled. +-----------------------------+--------------+--------------+------------------+ | Loop type | Iterations | Time (ms) | Time/iter (ns) | +-----------------------------|--------------+--------------+------------------+ | may_goto | 8388608 | 3 | 0.36 | | timed_may_goto (count=65535)| 589674932 | 250 | 0.42 | | bpf_for | 8388608 | 10 | 1.19 | +-----------------------------+--------------+--------------+------------------+ This gives a good approximation at low overhead while staying close to the current implementation. Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250304003239.2390751-2-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
6ebc5030e0 |
bpf: Fix array bounds error with may_goto
may_goto uses an additional 8 bytes on the stack, which causes the
interpreters[] array to go out of bounds when calculating index by
stack_size.
1. If a BPF program is rewritten, re-evaluate the stack size. For non-JIT
cases, reject loading directly.
2. For non-JIT cases, calculating interpreters[idx] may still cause
out-of-bounds array access, and just warn about it.
3. For jit_requested cases, the execution of bpf_func also needs to be
warned. So move the definition of function __bpf_prog_ret0_warn out of
the macro definition CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON.
Reported-by: syzbot+d2a2c639d03ac200a4f1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/0000000000000f823606139faa5d@google.com/
Fixes:
|
|
|
|
c4441ca86a |
bpf: fix potential error return
The bpf_remove_insns() function returns WARN_ON_ONCE(error), where error is a result of bpf_adj_branches(), and thus should be always 0 However, if for any reason it is not 0, then it will be converted to boolean by WARN_ON_ONCE and returned to user space as 1, not an actual error value. Fix this by returning the original err after the WARN check. Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <aspsk@isovalent.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241210114245.836164-1-aspsk@isovalent.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
b238e187b4 |
bpf: refactor bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data to use helper number
Use BPF helper number instead of function pointer in bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(). This would simplify usage of this function in verifier.c:check_cfg() (in a follow-up patch), where only helper number is easily available and there is no real need to lookup helper proto. Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241210041100.1898468-3-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
6e95ef0258 |
bpf-next-bpf-next-6.13
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEE+soXsSLHKoYyzcli6rmadz2vbToFAmc7hIQACgkQ6rmadz2v bTrcRA/+MsUOzJPnjokonHwk8X4KQM21gOua/sUcGArLVGF/JoW5/b1W8UBQ0y5+ +okYaRNGpwF0/2S8M5FAYpM7VSPLl1U7Rihr55I63D9kbAo0pDQwpn4afQFuZhaC l7MzkhBHS7XXx5/70APOzy3kz1GDYvz39jiWuAAhRqVejFO+fa4pDz4W+Ht7jYTQ jJOLn4vJna9fSfVf/U/bbdz5lL0lncIiEnRIEbF7EszbF2CA7sa+/KFENGM7ChEo UlxK2Xz5fpzgT6htZRjMr6jmupfg7gzdT4moOysQQcjkllvv6/4MD0s/GLShtG9H SmpaptpYCEGXLuApGzkSddwiT6iUMTqQr7zs6LPp0gPh+4Z0sSPNoBtBp2v0aVDl w0zhVhMfoF66rMG+IZY684CsMGg5h8UsOS46KLjSU0fW2HpGM7+zZLpXOaGkU3OH UV0womPT/C2kS2fpOn9F91O8qMjOZ4EXd+zuRtIRv9CeuVIpCT9R13lEYn+wfr6d aUci8wybha1UOAvkRiXiqWOPS+0Z/arrSbCSDMQF6DevLpQl0noVbTVssWXcRdUE 9Ve6J0yS29WxNWFtuuw4xP5NcG1AnRXVGh215TuVBX7xK9X/hnDDhfalltsjXfnd m1f64FxU2SGp2D7X8BX/6Aeyo6mITE6I3SNMUrcvk1Zid36zhy8= =TXGS -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'bpf-next-6.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next Pull bpf updates from Alexei Starovoitov: - Add BPF uprobe session support (Jiri Olsa) - Optimize uprobe performance (Andrii Nakryiko) - Add bpf_fastcall support to helpers and kfuncs (Eduard Zingerman) - Avoid calling free_htab_elem() under hash map bucket lock (Hou Tao) - Prevent tailcall infinite loop caused by freplace (Leon Hwang) - Mark raw_tracepoint arguments as nullable (Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi) - Introduce uptr support in the task local storage map (Martin KaFai Lau) - Stringify errno log messages in libbpf (Mykyta Yatsenko) - Add kmem_cache BPF iterator for perf's lock profiling (Namhyung Kim) - Support BPF objects of either endianness in libbpf (Tony Ambardar) - Add ksym to struct_ops trampoline to fix stack trace (Xu Kuohai) - Introduce private stack for eligible BPF programs (Yonghong Song) - Migrate samples/bpf tests to selftests/bpf test_progs (Daniel T. Lee) - Migrate test_sock to selftests/bpf test_progs (Jordan Rife) * tag 'bpf-next-6.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (152 commits) libbpf: Change hash_combine parameters from long to unsigned long selftests/bpf: Fix build error with llvm 19 libbpf: Fix memory leak in bpf_program__attach_uprobe_multi bpf: use common instruction history across all states bpf: Add necessary migrate_disable to range_tree. bpf: Do not alloc arena on unsupported arches selftests/bpf: Set test path for token/obj_priv_implicit_token_envvar selftests/bpf: Add a test for arena range tree algorithm bpf: Introduce range_tree data structure and use it in bpf arena samples/bpf: Remove unused variable in xdp2skb_meta_kern.c samples/bpf: Remove unused variables in tc_l2_redirect_kern.c bpftool: Cast variable `var` to long long bpf, x86: Propagate tailcall info only for subprogs bpf: Add kernel symbol for struct_ops trampoline bpf: Use function pointers count as struct_ops links count bpf: Remove unused member rcu from bpf_struct_ops_map selftests/bpf: Add struct_ops prog private stack tests bpf: Support private stack for struct_ops progs selftests/bpf: Add tracing prog private stack tests bpf, x86: Support private stack in jit ... |
|
|
|
8a7fa81137 |
Random number generator updates for Linux 6.13-rc1.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEq5lC5tSkz8NBJiCnSfxwEqXeA64FAmc6oE0ACgkQSfxwEqXe A65n5BAAtNmfBJhYRiC6Svsg7+ktHmhCAHoHwnP7sv+bjs81FRAEv21CsfI+02Nb zUvaPuyiLtYzlWxzE5Yg44v1cADHAq+QZE1Fg5yl7ge6zPZ3+S1pv/8suNSyyI2M PKvh1sb4OkUtqplveYSuP1J87u55zAtV9mP9qC3hSlY3XkeQUObt9Awss8peOMdv sH2AxwBlRkqFXpY2worxlfg3p5iLemb3AUZ3f0Jc6fRmOagSJCt7i4mDrWo3EXke 90Ao8ypY0x3YVGRFACHnxCS53X20HGwLxm7jdicfriMCzAJ6JQR6asO+NYnXR+Ev 9Za3UquVHP6HbQGWj6d1k5k2nF+IbkTHTgFBPRK/CY9ZpVbP04B2K7tE1gmT81wj AscRGi9RBVBPKAUguyi99MXYlprFG/ZTLOux3hvdarv5u0bP94eXmy1FrRM+IO0r u4BiQ39FlkDdtRxjzKfCiKkMrf3NmFEciZJhxCnflzmOBaj64r1hRt/ea8Bjxvp3 a4k0MfULmcEn2JwPiT1/Swz45ypZQc4OgbP87SCU8P0a23r21r2oK+9v3No/rCzB TI0fP6ykDTFQoiKUOSg1mJmkipdjeDyQ9E+0XIDsKd+T8Yv9rFoaV6RWoMrkt4AJ Yea9+V+XEI8F3SjhdD4OL/s3/+bjTjnRHDaXnJf2XzGmXcuvnbs= =o4ww -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'random-6.13-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random Pull random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld: "This contains a single series from Uros to replace uses of <linux/random.h> with prandom.h or other more specific headers as needed, in order to avoid a circular header issue. Uros' goal is to be able to use percpu.h from prandom.h, which will then allow him to define __percpu in percpu.h rather than in compiler_types.h" * tag 'random-6.13-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random: prandom: Include <linux/percpu.h> in <linux/prandom.h> random: Do not include <linux/prandom.h> in <linux/random.h> netem: Include <linux/prandom.h> in sch_netem.c lib/test_scanf: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h> lib/test_parman: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h> bpf/tests: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h> lib/rbtree-test: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h> random32: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h> kunit: string-stream-test: Include <linux/prandom.h> lib/interval_tree_test.c: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h> bpf: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h> scsi: libfcoe: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h> fscrypt: Include <linux/once.h> in fs/crypto/keyring.c mtd: tests: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h> media: vivid: Include <linux/prandom.h> in vivid-vid-cap.c drm/lib: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h> drm/i915/selftests: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h> crypto: testmgr: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h> x86/kaslr: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h> |
|
|
|
a76ab5731e |
bpf: Find eligible subprogs for private stack support
Private stack will be allocated with percpu allocator in jit time. To avoid complexity at runtime, only one copy of private stack is available per cpu per prog. So runtime recursion check is necessary to avoid stack corruption. Current private stack only supports kprobe/perf_event/tp/raw_tp which has recursion check in the kernel, and prog types that use bpf trampoline recursion check. For trampoline related prog types, currently only tracing progs have recursion checking. To avoid complexity, all async_cb subprogs use normal kernel stack including those subprogs used by both main prog subtree and async_cb subtree. Any prog having tail call also uses kernel stack. To avoid jit penalty with private stack support, a subprog stack size threshold is set such that only if the stack size is no less than the threshold, private stack is supported. The current threshold is 64 bytes. This avoids jit penality if the stack usage is small. A useless 'continue' is also removed from a loop in func check_max_stack_depth(). Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241112163907.2223839-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
d6083f040d |
bpf: Prevent tailcall infinite loop caused by freplace
There is a potential infinite loop issue that can occur when using a combination of tail calls and freplace. In an upcoming selftest, the attach target for entry_freplace of tailcall_freplace.c is subprog_tc of tc_bpf2bpf.c, while the tail call in entry_freplace leads to entry_tc. This results in an infinite loop: entry_tc -> subprog_tc -> entry_freplace --tailcall-> entry_tc. The problem arises because the tail_call_cnt in entry_freplace resets to zero each time entry_freplace is executed, causing the tail call mechanism to never terminate, eventually leading to a kernel panic. To fix this issue, the solution is twofold: 1. Prevent updating a program extended by an freplace program to a prog_array map. 2. Prevent extending a program that is already part of a prog_array map with an freplace program. This ensures that: * If a program or its subprogram has been extended by an freplace program, it can no longer be updated to a prog_array map. * If a program has been added to a prog_array map, neither it nor its subprograms can be extended by an freplace program. Moreover, an extension program should not be tailcalled. As such, return -EINVAL if the program has a type of BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT when adding it to a prog_array map. Additionally, fix a minor code style issue by replacing eight spaces with a tab for proper formatting. Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241015150207.70264-2-leon.hwang@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
aaedc2ff97 |
bpf: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h>
Substitute the inclusion of <linux/random.h> header with <linux/prandom.h> to allow the removal of legacy inclusion of <linux/prandom.h> from <linux/random.h>. Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev> Cc: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Cc: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me> Cc: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> |
|
|
|
5f60d5f6bb |
move asm/unaligned.h to linux/unaligned.h
asm/unaligned.h is always an include of asm-generic/unaligned.h; might as well move that thing to linux/unaligned.h and include that - there's nothing arch-specific in that header. auto-generated by the following: for i in `git grep -l -w asm/unaligned.h`; do sed -i -e "s/asm\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i done for i in `git grep -l -w asm-generic/unaligned.h`; do sed -i -e "s/asm-generic\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i done git mv include/asm-generic/unaligned.h include/linux/unaligned.h git mv tools/include/asm-generic/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h sed -i -e "/unaligned.h/d" include/asm-generic/Kbuild sed -i -e "s/__ASM_GENERIC/__LINUX/" include/linux/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h |
|
|
|
28ead3eaab |
bpf: Prevent tail call between progs attached to different hooks
bpf progs can be attached to kernel functions, and the attached functions can take different parameters or return different return values. If prog attached to one kernel function tail calls prog attached to another kernel function, the ctx access or return value verification could be bypassed. For example, if prog1 is attached to func1 which takes only 1 parameter and prog2 is attached to func2 which takes two parameters. Since verifier assumes the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed based on func2's prototype, verifier allows prog2 to access the second parameter from the bpf ctx passed to it. The problem is that verifier does not prevent prog1 from passing its bpf ctx to prog2 via tail call. In this case, the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed from func1 instead of func2, that is, the assumption for ctx access verification is bypassed. Another example, if BPF LSM prog1 is attached to hook file_alloc_security, and BPF LSM prog2 is attached to hook bpf_lsm_audit_rule_known. Verifier knows the return value rules for these two hooks, e.g. it is legal for bpf_lsm_audit_rule_known to return positive number 1, and it is illegal for file_alloc_security to return positive number. So verifier allows prog2 to return positive number 1, but does not allow prog1 to return positive number. The problem is that verifier does not prevent prog1 from calling prog2 via tail call. In this case, prog2's return value 1 will be used as the return value for prog1's hook file_alloc_security. That is, the return value rule is bypassed. This patch adds restriction for tail call to prevent such bypasses. Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240719110059.797546-4-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
7b769adc26 |
bpf-next-for-netdev
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYIAB0WIQTFp0I1jqZrAX+hPRXbK58LschIgwUCZoxN0AAKCRDbK58LschI g0c5AQDa3ZV9gfbN42y1zSDoM1uOgO60fb+ydxyOYh8l3+OiQQD/fLfpTY3gBFSY 9yi/pZhw/QdNzQskHNIBrHFGtJbMxgs= =p1Zz -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next Daniel Borkmann says: ==================== pull-request: bpf-next 2024-07-08 The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree. We've added 102 non-merge commits during the last 28 day(s) which contain a total of 127 files changed, 4606 insertions(+), 980 deletions(-). The main changes are: 1) Support resilient split BTF which cuts down on duplication and makes BTF as compact as possible wrt BTF from modules, from Alan Maguire & Eduard Zingerman. 2) Add support for dumping kfunc prototypes from BTF which enables both detecting as well as dumping compilable prototypes for kfuncs, from Daniel Xu. 3) Batch of s390x BPF JIT improvements to add support for BPF arena and to implement support for BPF exceptions, from Ilya Leoshkevich. 4) Batch of riscv64 BPF JIT improvements in particular to add 12-argument support for BPF trampolines and to utilize bpf_prog_pack for the latter, from Pu Lehui. 5) Extend BPF test infrastructure to add a CHECKSUM_COMPLETE validation option for skbs and add coverage along with it, from Vadim Fedorenko. 6) Inline bpf_get_current_task/_btf() helpers in the arm64 BPF JIT which gives a small 1% performance improvement in micro-benchmarks, from Puranjay Mohan. 7) Extend the BPF verifier to track the delta between linked registers in order to better deal with recent LLVM code optimizations, from Alexei Starovoitov. 8) Fix bpf_wq_set_callback_impl() kfunc signature where the third argument should have been a pointer to the map value, from Benjamin Tissoires. 9) Extend BPF selftests to add regular expression support for test output matching and adjust some of the selftest when compiled under gcc, from Cupertino Miranda. 10) Simplify task_file_seq_get_next() and remove an unnecessary loop which always iterates exactly once anyway, from Dan Carpenter. 11) Add the capability to offload the netfilter flowtable in XDP layer through kfuncs, from Florian Westphal & Lorenzo Bianconi. 12) Various cleanups in networking helpers in BPF selftests to shave off a few lines of open-coded functions on client/server handling, from Geliang Tang. 13) Properly propagate prog->aux->tail_call_reachable out of BPF verifier, so that x86 JIT does not need to implement detection, from Leon Hwang. 14) Fix BPF verifier to add a missing check_func_arg_reg_off() to prevent an out-of-bounds memory access for dynpointers, from Matt Bobrowski. 15) Fix bpf_session_cookie() kfunc to return __u64 instead of long pointer as it might lead to problems on 32-bit archs, from Jiri Olsa. 16) Enhance traffic validation and dynamic batch size support in xsk selftests, from Tushar Vyavahare. bpf-next-for-netdev * tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (102 commits) selftests/bpf: DENYLIST.aarch64: Remove fexit_sleep selftests/bpf: amend for wrong bpf_wq_set_callback_impl signature bpf: helpers: fix bpf_wq_set_callback_impl signature libbpf: Add NULL checks to bpf_object__{prev_map,next_map} selftests/bpf: Remove exceptions tests from DENYLIST.s390x s390/bpf: Implement exceptions s390/bpf: Change seen_reg to a mask bpf: Remove unnecessary loop in task_file_seq_get_next() riscv, bpf: Optimize stack usage of trampoline bpf, devmap: Add .map_alloc_check selftests/bpf: Remove arena tests from DENYLIST.s390x selftests/bpf: Add UAF tests for arena atomics selftests/bpf: Introduce __arena_global s390/bpf: Support arena atomics s390/bpf: Enable arena s390/bpf: Support address space cast instruction s390/bpf: Support BPF_PROBE_MEM32 s390/bpf: Land on the next JITed instruction after exception s390/bpf: Introduce pre- and post- probe functions s390/bpf: Get rid of get_probe_mem_regno() ... ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240708221438.10974-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> |
|
|
|
7e1f4eb9a6 |
kallsyms: rework symbol lookup return codes
Building with W=1 in some configurations produces a false positive
warning for kallsyms:
kernel/kallsyms.c: In function '__sprint_symbol.isra':
kernel/kallsyms.c:503:17: error: 'strcpy' source argument is the same as destination [-Werror=restrict]
503 | strcpy(buffer, name);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This originally showed up while building with -O3, but later started
happening in other configurations as well, depending on inlining
decisions. The underlying issue is that the local 'name' variable is
always initialized to the be the same as 'buffer' in the called functions
that fill the buffer, which gcc notices while inlining, though it could
see that the address check always skips the copy.
The calling conventions here are rather unusual, as all of the internal
lookup functions (bpf_address_lookup, ftrace_mod_address_lookup,
ftrace_func_address_lookup, module_address_lookup and
kallsyms_lookup_buildid) already use the provided buffer and either return
the address of that buffer to indicate success, or NULL for failure,
but the callers are written to also expect an arbitrary other buffer
to be returned.
Rework the calling conventions to return the length of the filled buffer
instead of its address, which is simpler and easier to follow as well
as avoiding the warning. Leave only the kallsyms_lookup() calling conventions
unchanged, since that is called from 16 different functions and
adapting this would be a much bigger change.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200107214042.855757-1-arnd@arndb.de/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240326130647.7bfb1d92@gandalf.local.home/
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
|
|
|
|
ab224b9ef7 |
bpf: remove unused parameter in __bpf_free_used_btfs
Fixes a compiler warning. The __bpf_free_used_btfs function was taking an extra unused struct bpf_prog_aux *aux param Signed-off-by: Rafael Passos <rafael@rcpassos.me> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240615022641.210320-3-rafael@rcpassos.me Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
9919c5c98c |
bpf: remove unused parameter in bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize
Fixes a compiler warning. the bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize function was taking an extra bpf_prog parameter that went unused. This removves it and updates the callers accordingly. Signed-off-by: Rafael Passos <rafael@rcpassos.me> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240615022641.210320-2-rafael@rcpassos.me Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
a49468240e |
Modules changes for v6.10-rc1
Finally something fun. Mike Rapoport does some cleanup to allow us to
take out module_alloc() out of modules into a new paint shedded execmem_alloc()
and execmem_free() so to make emphasis these helpers are actually used outside
of modules. It starts with a no-functional changes API rename / placeholders
to then allow architectures to define their requirements into a new shiny
struct execmem_info with ranges, and requirements for those ranges. Archs
now can intitialize this execmem_info as the last part of mm_core_init() if
they have to diverge from the norm. Each range is a known type clearly
articulated and spelled out in enum execmem_type.
Although a lot of this is major cleanup and prep work for future enhancements an
immediate clear gain is we get to enable KPROBES without MODULES now. That is
ultimately what motiviated to pick this work up again, now with smaller goal as
concrete stepping stone.
This has been sitting on linux-next for a little less than a month, a few issues
were found already and fixed, in particular an odd mips boot issue. Arch folks
reviewed the code too. This is ready for wider exposure and testing.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=Nsg4
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'modules-6.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mcgrof/linux
Pull modules updates from Luis Chamberlain:
"Finally something fun. Mike Rapoport does some cleanup to allow us to
take out module_alloc() out of modules into a new paint shedded
execmem_alloc() and execmem_free() so to make emphasis these helpers
are actually used outside of modules.
It starts with a non-functional changes API rename / placeholders to
then allow architectures to define their requirements into a new shiny
struct execmem_info with ranges, and requirements for those ranges.
Archs now can intitialize this execmem_info as the last part of
mm_core_init() if they have to diverge from the norm. Each range is a
known type clearly articulated and spelled out in enum execmem_type.
Although a lot of this is major cleanup and prep work for future
enhancements an immediate clear gain is we get to enable KPROBES
without MODULES now. That is ultimately what motiviated to pick this
work up again, now with smaller goal as concrete stepping stone"
* tag 'modules-6.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mcgrof/linux:
bpf: remove CONFIG_BPF_JIT dependency on CONFIG_MODULES of
kprobes: remove dependency on CONFIG_MODULES
powerpc: use CONFIG_EXECMEM instead of CONFIG_MODULES where appropriate
x86/ftrace: enable dynamic ftrace without CONFIG_MODULES
arch: make execmem setup available regardless of CONFIG_MODULES
powerpc: extend execmem_params for kprobes allocations
arm64: extend execmem_info for generated code allocations
riscv: extend execmem_params for generated code allocations
mm/execmem, arch: convert remaining overrides of module_alloc to execmem
mm/execmem, arch: convert simple overrides of module_alloc to execmem
mm: introduce execmem_alloc() and execmem_free()
module: make module_memory_{alloc,free} more self-contained
sparc: simplify module_alloc()
nios2: define virtual address space for modules
mips: module: rename MODULE_START to MODULES_VADDR
arm64: module: remove unneeded call to kasan_alloc_module_shadow()
kallsyms: replace deprecated strncpy with strscpy
module: allow UNUSED_KSYMS_WHITELIST to be relative against objtree.
|
|
|
|
12af2b83d0 |
mm: introduce execmem_alloc() and execmem_free()
module_alloc() is used everywhere as a mean to allocate memory for code. Beside being semantically wrong, this unnecessarily ties all subsystems that need to allocate code, such as ftrace, kprobes and BPF to modules and puts the burden of code allocation to the modules code. Several architectures override module_alloc() because of various constraints where the executable memory can be located and this causes additional obstacles for improvements of code allocation. Start splitting code allocation from modules by introducing execmem_alloc() and execmem_free() APIs. Initially, execmem_alloc() is a wrapper for module_alloc() and execmem_free() is a replacement of module_memfree() to allow updating all call sites to use the new APIs. Since architectures define different restrictions on placement, permissions, alignment and other parameters for memory that can be used by different subsystems that allocate executable memory, execmem_alloc() takes a type argument, that will be used to identify the calling subsystem and to allow architectures define parameters for ranges suitable for that subsystem. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
6e62702feb |
bpf-next-for-netdev
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYIAB0WIQTFp0I1jqZrAX+hPRXbK58LschIgwUCZkGcZAAKCRDbK58LschI g6o6APwLsqhrM2w71VUN5ciCxu4H5VDtZp6wkdqtVbxxU4qNxQEApKgYgKt8ZLF3 Kily5c7m+S4ZXhMX21rb8JhSAz0dfQk= =5Dk7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next Daniel Borkmann says: ==================== pull-request: bpf-next 2024-05-13 We've added 119 non-merge commits during the last 14 day(s) which contain a total of 134 files changed, 9462 insertions(+), 4742 deletions(-). The main changes are: 1) Add BPF JIT support for 32-bit ARCv2 processors, from Shahab Vahedi. 2) Add BPF range computation improvements to the verifier in particular around XOR and OR operators, refactoring of checks for range computation and relaxing MUL range computation so that src_reg can also be an unknown scalar, from Cupertino Miranda. 3) Add support to attach kprobe BPF programs through kprobe_multi link in a session mode, meaning, a BPF program is attached to both function entry and return, the entry program can decide if the return program gets executed and the entry program can share u64 cookie value with return program. Session mode is a common use-case for tetragon and bpftrace, from Jiri Olsa. 4) Fix a potential overflow in libbpf's ring__consume_n() and improve libbpf as well as BPF selftest's struct_ops handling, from Andrii Nakryiko. 5) Improvements to BPF selftests in context of BPF gcc backend, from Jose E. Marchesi & David Faust. 6) Migrate remaining BPF selftest tests from test_sock_addr.c to prog_test- -style in order to retire the old test, run it in BPF CI and additionally expand test coverage, from Jordan Rife. 7) Big batch for BPF selftest refactoring in order to remove duplicate code around common network helpers, from Geliang Tang. 8) Another batch of improvements to BPF selftests to retire obsolete bpf_tcp_helpers.h as everything is available vmlinux.h, from Martin KaFai Lau. 9) Fix BPF map tear-down to not walk the map twice on free when both timer and wq is used, from Benjamin Tissoires. 10) Fix BPF verifier assumptions about socket->sk that it can be non-NULL, from Alexei Starovoitov. 11) Change BTF build scripts to using --btf_features for pahole v1.26+, from Alan Maguire. 12) Small improvements to BPF reusing struct_size() and krealloc_array(), from Andy Shevchenko. 13) Fix s390 JIT to emit a barrier for BPF_FETCH instructions, from Ilya Leoshkevich. 14) Extend TCP ->cong_control() callback in order to feed in ack and flag parameters and allow write-access to tp->snd_cwnd_stamp from BPF program, from Miao Xu. 15) Add support for internal-only per-CPU instructions to inline bpf_get_smp_processor_id() helper call for arm64 and riscv64 BPF JITs, from Puranjay Mohan. 16) Follow-up to remove the redundant ethtool.h from tooling infrastructure, from Tushar Vyavahare. 17) Extend libbpf to support "module:<function>" syntax for tracing programs, from Viktor Malik. * tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (119 commits) bpf: make list_for_each_entry portable bpf: ignore expected GCC warning in test_global_func10.c bpf: disable strict aliasing in test_global_func9.c selftests/bpf: Free strdup memory in xdp_hw_metadata selftests/bpf: Fix a few tests for GCC related warnings. bpf: avoid gcc overflow warning in test_xdp_vlan.c tools: remove redundant ethtool.h from tooling infra selftests/bpf: Expand ATTACH_REJECT tests selftests/bpf: Expand getsockname and getpeername tests sefltests/bpf: Expand sockaddr hook deny tests selftests/bpf: Expand sockaddr program return value tests selftests/bpf: Retire test_sock_addr.(c|sh) selftests/bpf: Remove redundant sendmsg test cases selftests/bpf: Migrate ATTACH_REJECT test cases selftests/bpf: Migrate expected_attach_type tests selftests/bpf: Migrate wildcard destination rewrite test selftests/bpf: Migrate sendmsg6 v4 mapped address tests selftests/bpf: Migrate sendmsg deny test cases selftests/bpf: Migrate WILDCARD_IP test selftests/bpf: Handle SYSCALL_EPERM and SYSCALL_ENOTSUPP test cases ... ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240513134114.17575-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
2ddec2c80b |
riscv, bpf: inline bpf_get_smp_processor_id()
Inline the calls to bpf_get_smp_processor_id() in the riscv bpf jit.
RISCV saves the pointer to the CPU's task_struct in the TP (thread
pointer) register. This makes it trivial to get the CPU's processor id.
As thread_info is the first member of task_struct, we can read the
processor id from TP + offsetof(struct thread_info, cpu).
RISCV64 JIT output for `call bpf_get_smp_processor_id`
======================================================
Before After
-------- -------
auipc t1,0x848c ld a5,32(tp)
jalr 604(t1)
mv a5,a0
Benchmark using [1] on Qemu.
./benchs/run_bench_trigger.sh glob-arr-inc arr-inc hash-inc
+---------------+------------------+------------------+--------------+
| Name | Before | After | % change |
|---------------+------------------+------------------+--------------|
| glob-arr-inc | 1.077 ± 0.006M/s | 1.336 ± 0.010M/s | + 24.04% |
| arr-inc | 1.078 ± 0.002M/s | 1.332 ± 0.015M/s | + 23.56% |
| hash-inc | 0.494 ± 0.004M/s | 0.653 ± 0.001M/s | + 32.18% |
+---------------+------------------+------------------+--------------+
NOTE: This benchmark includes changes from this patch and the previous
patch that implemented the per-cpu insn.
[1] https://github.com/anakryiko/linux/commit/8dec900975ef
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502151854.9810-3-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
|
|
e958da0ddb |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR. Conflicts: include/linux/filter.h kernel/bpf/core.c |
|
|
|
a3034872cd |
bpf: Switch to krealloc_array()
Let the krealloc_array() copy the original data and check for a multiplication overflow. Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240429120005.3539116-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com |
|
|
|
cb01621b6d |
bpf: Use struct_size()
Use struct_size() instead of hand writing it. This is less verbose and more robust. Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240429121323.3818497-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com |
|
|
|
66e13b615a |
bpf: verifier: prevent userspace memory access
With BPF_PROBE_MEM, BPF allows de-referencing an untrusted pointer. To
thwart invalid memory accesses, the JITs add an exception table entry
for all such accesses. But in case the src_reg + offset is a userspace
address, the BPF program might read that memory if the user has
mapped it.
Make the verifier add guard instructions around such memory accesses and
skip the load if the address falls into the userspace region.
The JITs need to implement bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() to define where
the userspace addresses end for that architecture or TASK_SIZE is taken
as default.
The implementation is as follows:
REG_AX = SRC_REG
if(offset)
REG_AX += offset;
REG_AX >>= 32;
if (REG_AX <= (uaddress_limit >> 32))
DST_REG = 0;
else
DST_REG = *(size *)(SRC_REG + offset);
Comparing just the upper 32 bits of the load address with the upper
32 bits of uaddress_limit implies that the values are being aligned down
to a 4GB boundary before comparison.
The above means that all loads with address <= uaddress_limit + 4GB are
skipped. This is acceptable because there is a large hole (much larger
than 4GB) between userspace and kernel space memory, therefore a
correctly functioning BPF program should not access this 4GB memory
above the userspace.
Let's analyze what this patch does to the following fentry program
dereferencing an untrusted pointer:
SEC("fentry/tcp_v4_connect")
int BPF_PROG(fentry_tcp_v4_connect, struct sock *sk)
{
*(volatile long *)sk;
return 0;
}
BPF Program before | BPF Program after
------------------ | -----------------
0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) 0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) --\ 1: (bf) r11 = r1
----------------------------\ \ 2: (77) r11 >>= 32
2: (b7) r0 = 0 \ \ 3: (b5) if r11 <= 0x8000 goto pc+2
3: (95) exit \ \-> 4: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
\ 5: (05) goto pc+1
\ 6: (b7) r1 = 0
\--------------------------------------
7: (b7) r0 = 0
8: (95) exit
As you can see from above, in the best case (off=0), 5 extra instructions
are emitted.
Now, we analyze the same program after it has gone through the JITs of
ARM64 and RISC-V architectures. We follow the single load instruction
that has the untrusted pointer and see what instrumentation has been
added around it.
x86-64 JIT
==========
JIT's Instrumentation
(upstream)
---------------------
0: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
5: xchg %ax,%ax
7: push %rbp
8: mov %rsp,%rbp
b: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi
---------------------------------
f: movabs $0x800000000000,%r11
19: cmp %r11,%rdi
1c: jb 0x000000000000002a
1e: mov %rdi,%r11
21: add $0x0,%r11
28: jae 0x000000000000002e
2a: xor %edi,%edi
2c: jmp 0x0000000000000032
2e: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi
---------------------------------
32: xor %eax,%eax
34: leave
35: ret
The x86-64 JIT already emits some instructions to protect against user
memory access. This patch doesn't make any changes for the x86-64 JIT.
ARM64 JIT
=========
No Intrumentation Verifier's Instrumentation
(upstream) (This patch)
----------------- --------------------------
0: add x9, x30, #0x0 0: add x9, x30, #0x0
4: nop 4: nop
8: paciasp 8: paciasp
c: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! c: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
10: mov x29, sp 10: mov x29, sp
14: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! 14: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]!
18: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! 18: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]!
1c: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! 1c: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]!
20: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]! 20: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]!
24: mov x25, sp 24: mov x25, sp
28: mov x26, #0x0 28: mov x26, #0x0
2c: sub x27, x25, #0x0 2c: sub x27, x25, #0x0
30: sub sp, sp, #0x0 30: sub sp, sp, #0x0
34: ldr x0, [x0] 34: ldr x0, [x0]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
38: ldr x0, [x0] ----------\ 38: add x9, x0, #0x0
-----------------------------------\\ 3c: lsr x9, x9, #32
3c: mov x7, #0x0 \\ 40: cmp x9, #0x10, lsl #12
40: mov sp, sp \\ 44: b.ls 0x0000000000000050
44: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16 \\--> 48: ldr x0, [x0]
48: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16 \ 4c: b 0x0000000000000054
4c: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16 \ 50: mov x0, #0x0
50: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16 \---------------------------------------
54: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 54: mov x7, #0x0
58: add x0, x7, #0x0 58: mov sp, sp
5c: autiasp 5c: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16
60: ret 60: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16
64: nop 64: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16
68: ldr x10, 0x0000000000000070 68: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16
6c: br x10 6c: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16
70: add x0, x7, #0x0
74: autiasp
78: ret
7c: nop
80: ldr x10, 0x0000000000000088
84: br x10
There are 6 extra instructions added in ARM64 in the best case. This will
become 7 in the worst case (off != 0).
RISC-V JIT (RISCV_ISA_C Disabled)
==========
No Intrumentation Verifier's Instrumentation
(upstream) (This patch)
----------------- --------------------------
0: nop 0: nop
4: nop 4: nop
8: li a6, 33 8: li a6, 33
c: addi sp, sp, -16 c: addi sp, sp, -16
10: sd s0, 8(sp) 10: sd s0, 8(sp)
14: addi s0, sp, 16 14: addi s0, sp, 16
18: ld a0, 0(a0) 18: ld a0, 0(a0)
---------------------------------------------------------------
1c: ld a0, 0(a0) --\ 1c: mv t0, a0
--------------------------\ \ 20: srli t0, t0, 32
20: li a5, 0 \ \ 24: lui t1, 4096
24: ld s0, 8(sp) \ \ 28: sext.w t1, t1
28: addi sp, sp, 16 \ \ 2c: bgeu t1, t0, 12
2c: sext.w a0, a5 \ \--> 30: ld a0, 0(a0)
30: ret \ 34: j 8
\ 38: li a0, 0
\------------------------------
3c: li a5, 0
40: ld s0, 8(sp)
44: addi sp, sp, 16
48: sext.w a0, a5
4c: ret
There are 7 extra instructions added in RISC-V.
Fixes:
|
|
|
|
a7de265cb2 |
bpf: Fix typos in comments
Found the following typos in comments, and fixed them: s/unpriviledged/unprivileged/ s/reponsible/responsible/ s/possiblities/possibilities/ s/Divison/Division/ s/precsion/precision/ s/havea/have a/ s/reponsible/responsible/ s/responsibile/responsible/ s/tigher/tighter/ s/respecitve/respective/ Signed-off-by: Rafael Passos <rafael@rcpassos.me> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/6af7deb4-bb24-49e8-b3f1-8dd410597337@smtp-relay.sendinblue.com |
|
|
|
d503a04f8b |
bpf: Add support for certain atomics in bpf_arena to x86 JIT
Support atomics in bpf_arena that can be JITed as a single x86 instruction. Instructions that are JITed as loops are not supported at the moment, since they require more complex extable and loop logic. JITs can choose to do smarter things with bpf_jit_supports_insn(). Like arm64 may decide to support all bpf atomics instructions when emit_lse_atomic is available and none in ll_sc mode. bpf_jit_supports_percpu_insn(), bpf_jit_supports_ptr_xchg() and other such callbacks can be replaced with bpf_jit_supports_insn() in the future. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240405231134.17274-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
7bdbf74463 |
bpf: add special internal-only MOV instruction to resolve per-CPU addrs
Add a new BPF instruction for resolving absolute addresses of per-CPU data from their per-CPU offsets. This instruction is internal-only and users are not allowed to use them directly. They will only be used for internal inlining optimizations for now between BPF verifier and BPF JITs. We use a special BPF_MOV | BPF_ALU64 | BPF_X form with insn->off field set to BPF_ADDR_PERCPU = -1. I used negative offset value to distinguish them from positive ones used by user-exposed instructions. Such instruction performs a resolution of a per-CPU offset stored in a register to a valid kernel address which can be dereferenced. It is useful in any use case where absolute address of a per-CPU data has to be resolved (e.g., in inlining bpf_map_lookup_elem()). BPF disassembler is also taught to recognize them to support dumping final BPF assembly code (non-JIT'ed version). Add arch-specific way for BPF JITs to mark support for this instructions. This patch also adds support for these instructions in x86-64 BPF JIT. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240402021307.1012571-2-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
2e114248e0 |
bpf: Replace deprecated strncpy with strscpy
strncpy() is deprecated for use on NUL-terminated destination strings
[1] and as such we should prefer more robust and less ambiguous string
interfaces.
bpf sym names get looked up and compared/cleaned with various string
apis. This suggests they need to be NUL-terminated (strncpy() suggests
this but does not guarantee it).
| static int compare_symbol_name(const char *name, char *namebuf)
| {
| cleanup_symbol_name(namebuf);
| return strcmp(name, namebuf);
| }
| static void cleanup_symbol_name(char *s)
| {
| ...
| res = strstr(s, ".llvm.");
| ...
| }
Use strscpy() as this method guarantees NUL-termination on the
destination buffer.
This patch also replaces two uses of strncpy() used in log.c. These are
simple replacements as postfix has been zero-initialized on the stack
and has source arguments with a size less than the destination's size.
Note that this patch uses the new 2-argument version of strscpy
introduced in commit
|
|
|
|
e8742081db |
bpf: Mark bpf prog stack with kmsan_unposion_memory in interpreter mode
syzbot reported uninit memory usages during map_{lookup,delete}_elem.
==========
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __dev_map_lookup_elem kernel/bpf/devmap.c:441 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in dev_map_lookup_elem+0xf3/0x170 kernel/bpf/devmap.c:796
__dev_map_lookup_elem kernel/bpf/devmap.c:441 [inline]
dev_map_lookup_elem+0xf3/0x170 kernel/bpf/devmap.c:796
____bpf_map_lookup_elem kernel/bpf/helpers.c:42 [inline]
bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x5c/0x80 kernel/bpf/helpers.c:38
___bpf_prog_run+0x13fe/0xe0f0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1997
__bpf_prog_run256+0xb5/0xe0 kernel/bpf/core.c:2237
==========
The reproducer should be in the interpreter mode.
The C reproducer is trying to run the following bpf prog:
0: (18) r0 = 0x0
2: (18) r1 = map[id:49]
4: (b7) r8 = 16777216
5: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r8
6: (bf) r2 = r10
7: (07) r2 += -229
^^^^^^^^^^
8: (b7) r3 = 8
9: (b7) r4 = 0
10: (85) call dev_map_lookup_elem#1543472
11: (95) exit
It is due to the "void *key" (r2) passed to the helper. bpf allows uninit
stack memory access for bpf prog with the right privileges. This patch
uses kmsan_unpoison_memory() to mark the stack as initialized.
This should address different syzbot reports on the uninit "void *key"
argument during map_{lookup,delete}_elem.
Reported-by: syzbot+603bcd9b0bf1d94dbb9b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000f9ce6d061494e694@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+eb02dc7f03dce0ef39f3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000a5c69c06147c2238@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+b4e65ca24fd4d0c734c3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000ac56fb06143b6cfa@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+d2b113dc9fea5e1d2848@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/0000000000000d69b206142d1ff7@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+1a3cf6f08d68868f9db3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/0000000000006f876b061478e878@google.com/
Tested-by: syzbot+1a3cf6f08d68868f9db3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240328185801.1843078-1-martin.lau@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
|
|
c733239f8f |
bpf: Check return from set_memory_rox()
arch_protect_bpf_trampoline() and alloc_new_pack() call set_memory_rox() which can fail, leading to unprotected memory. Take into account return from set_memory_rox() function and add __must_check flag to arch_protect_bpf_trampoline(). Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fe1c163c83767fde5cab31d209a4a6be3ddb3a73.1710574353.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
7d2cc63eca |
bpf: Take return from set_memory_ro() into account with bpf_prog_lock_ro()
set_memory_ro() can fail, leaving memory unprotected. Check its return and take it into account as an error. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/7 Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Message-ID: <286def78955e04382b227cb3e4b6ba272a7442e3.1709850515.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
66c8473135 |
bpf: move sleepable flag from bpf_prog_aux to bpf_prog
prog->aux->sleepable is checked very frequently as part of (some) BPF program run hot paths. So this extra aux indirection seems wasteful and on busy systems might cause unnecessary memory cache misses. Let's move sleepable flag into prog itself to eliminate unnecessary pointer dereference. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Message-ID: <20240309004739.2961431-1-andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
d6170e4aaf |
bpf: hardcode BPF_PROG_PACK_SIZE to 2MB * num_possible_nodes()
On some architectures like ARM64, PMD_SIZE can be really large in some
configurations. Like with CONFIG_ARM64_64K_PAGES=y the PMD_SIZE is
512MB.
Use 2MB * num_possible_nodes() as the size for allocations done through
the prog pack allocator. On most architectures, PMD_SIZE will be equal
to 2MB in case of 4KB pages and will be greater than 2MB for bigger page
sizes.
Fixes:
|
|
|
|
142fd4d2dc |
bpf: Add x86-64 JIT support for bpf_addr_space_cast instruction.
LLVM generates bpf_addr_space_cast instruction while translating pointers between native (zero) address space and __attribute__((address_space(N))). The addr_space=1 is reserved as bpf_arena address space. rY = addr_space_cast(rX, 0, 1) is processed by the verifier and converted to normal 32-bit move: wX = wY rY = addr_space_cast(rX, 1, 0) has to be converted by JIT: aux_reg = upper_32_bits of arena->user_vm_start aux_reg <<= 32 wX = wY // clear upper 32 bits of dst register if (wX) // if not zero add upper bits of user_vm_start wX |= aux_reg JIT can do it more efficiently: mov dst_reg32, src_reg32 // 32-bit move shl dst_reg, 32 or dst_reg, user_vm_start rol dst_reg, 32 xor r11, r11 test dst_reg32, dst_reg32 // check if lower 32-bit are zero cmove r11, dst_reg // if so, set dst_reg to zero // Intel swapped src/dst register encoding in CMOVcc Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240308010812.89848-5-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com |
|
|
|
317460317a |
bpf: Introduce bpf_arena.
Introduce bpf_arena, which is a sparse shared memory region between the bpf program and user space. Use cases: 1. User space mmap-s bpf_arena and uses it as a traditional mmap-ed anonymous region, like memcached or any key/value storage. The bpf program implements an in-kernel accelerator. XDP prog can search for a key in bpf_arena and return a value without going to user space. 2. The bpf program builds arbitrary data structures in bpf_arena (hash tables, rb-trees, sparse arrays), while user space consumes it. 3. bpf_arena is a "heap" of memory from the bpf program's point of view. The user space may mmap it, but bpf program will not convert pointers to user base at run-time to improve bpf program speed. Initially, the kernel vm_area and user vma are not populated. User space can fault in pages within the range. While servicing a page fault, bpf_arena logic will insert a new page into the kernel and user vmas. The bpf program can allocate pages from that region via bpf_arena_alloc_pages(). This kernel function will insert pages into the kernel vm_area. The subsequent fault-in from user space will populate that page into the user vma. The BPF_F_SEGV_ON_FAULT flag at arena creation time can be used to prevent fault-in from user space. In such a case, if a page is not allocated by the bpf program and not present in the kernel vm_area, the user process will segfault. This is useful for use cases 2 and 3 above. bpf_arena_alloc_pages() is similar to user space mmap(). It allocates pages either at a specific address within the arena or allocates a range with the maple tree. bpf_arena_free_pages() is analogous to munmap(), which frees pages and removes the range from the kernel vm_area and from user process vmas. bpf_arena can be used as a bpf program "heap" of up to 4GB. The speed of bpf program is more important than ease of sharing with user space. This is use case 3. In such a case, the BPF_F_NO_USER_CONV flag is recommended. It will tell the verifier to treat the rX = bpf_arena_cast_user(rY) instruction as a 32-bit move wX = wY, which will improve bpf prog performance. Otherwise, bpf_arena_cast_user is translated by JIT to conditionally add the upper 32 bits of user vm_start (if the pointer is not NULL) to arena pointers before they are stored into memory. This way, user space sees them as valid 64-bit pointers. Diff https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/84410 enables LLVM BPF backend generate the bpf_addr_space_cast() instruction to cast pointers between address_space(1) which is reserved for bpf_arena pointers and default address space zero. All arena pointers in a bpf program written in C language are tagged as __attribute__((address_space(1))). Hence, clang provides helpful diagnostics when pointers cross address space. Libbpf and the kernel support only address_space == 1. All other address space identifiers are reserved. rX = bpf_addr_space_cast(rY, /* dst_as */ 1, /* src_as */ 0) tells the verifier that rX->type = PTR_TO_ARENA. Any further operations on PTR_TO_ARENA register have to be in the 32-bit domain. The verifier will mark load/store through PTR_TO_ARENA with PROBE_MEM32. JIT will generate them as kern_vm_start + 32bit_addr memory accesses. The behavior is similar to copy_from_kernel_nofault() except that no address checks are necessary. The address is guaranteed to be in the 4GB range. If the page is not present, the destination register is zeroed on read, and the operation is ignored on write. rX = bpf_addr_space_cast(rY, 0, 1) tells the verifier that rX->type = unknown scalar. If arena->map_flags has BPF_F_NO_USER_CONV set, then the verifier converts such cast instructions to mov32. Otherwise, JIT will emit native code equivalent to: rX = (u32)rY; if (rY) rX |= clear_lo32_bits(arena->user_vm_start); /* replace hi32 bits in rX */ After such conversion, the pointer becomes a valid user pointer within bpf_arena range. The user process can access data structures created in bpf_arena without any additional computations. For example, a linked list built by a bpf program can be walked natively by user space. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240308010812.89848-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com |
|
|
|
fe5064158c |
bpf: Tell bpf programs kernel's PAGE_SIZE
vmlinux BTF includes all kernel enums. Add __PAGE_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE enum, so that bpf programs that include vmlinux.h can easily access it. Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240307031228.42896-7-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
011832b97b |
bpf: Introduce may_goto instruction
Introduce may_goto instruction that from the verifier pov is similar to
open coded iterators bpf_for()/bpf_repeat() and bpf_loop() helper, but it
doesn't iterate any objects.
In assembly 'may_goto' is a nop most of the time until bpf runtime has to
terminate the program for whatever reason. In the current implementation
may_goto has a hidden counter, but other mechanisms can be used.
For programs written in C the later patch introduces 'cond_break' macro
that combines 'may_goto' with 'break' statement and has similar semantics:
cond_break is a nop until bpf runtime has to break out of this loop.
It can be used in any normal "for" or "while" loop, like
for (i = zero; i < cnt; cond_break, i++) {
The verifier recognizes that may_goto is used in the program, reserves
additional 8 bytes of stack, initializes them in subprog prologue, and
replaces may_goto instruction with:
aux_reg = *(u64 *)(fp - 40)
if aux_reg == 0 goto pc+off
aux_reg -= 1
*(u64 *)(fp - 40) = aux_reg
may_goto instruction can be used by LLVM to implement __builtin_memcpy,
__builtin_strcmp.
may_goto is not a full substitute for bpf_for() macro.
bpf_for() doesn't have induction variable that verifiers sees,
so 'i' in bpf_for(i, 0, 100) is seen as imprecise and bounded.
But when the code is written as:
for (i = 0; i < 100; cond_break, i++)
the verifier see 'i' as precise constant zero,
hence cond_break (aka may_goto) doesn't help to converge the loop.
A static or global variable can be used as a workaround:
static int zero = 0;
for (i = zero; i < 100; cond_break, i++) // works!
may_goto works well with arena pointers that don't need to be bounds
checked on access. Load/store from arena returns imprecise unbounded
scalar and loops with may_goto pass the verifier.
Reserve new opcode BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND for may_goto insn.
JCOND stands for conditional pseudo jump.
Since goto_or_nop insn was proposed, it may use the same opcode.
may_goto vs goto_or_nop can be distinguished by src_reg:
code = BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND
src_reg = 0 - may_goto
src_reg = 1 - goto_or_nop
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Tested-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240306031929.42666-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
|
|
|
|
d79a354975 |
bpf: Consistently use BPF token throughout BPF verifier logic
Remove remaining direct queries to perfmon_capable() and bpf_capable() in BPF verifier logic and instead use BPF token (if available) to make decisions about privileges. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-9-andrii@kernel.org |
|
|
|
caf8f28e03 |
bpf: Add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command
Add basic support of BPF token to BPF_PROG_LOAD. BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag should be set in prog_flags field when providing prog_token_fd. Wire through a set of allowed BPF program types and attach types, derived from BPF FS at BPF token creation time. Then make sure we perform bpf_token_capable() checks everywhere where it's relevant. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-7-andrii@kernel.org |
|
|
|
7c05e7f3e7 |
bpf: Support inlining bpf_kptr_xchg() helper
The motivation of inlining bpf_kptr_xchg() comes from the performance profiling of bpf memory allocator benchmark. The benchmark uses bpf_kptr_xchg() to stash the allocated objects and to pop the stashed objects for free. After inling bpf_kptr_xchg(), the performance for object free on 8-CPUs VM increases about 2%~10%. The inline also has downside: both the kasan and kcsan checks on the pointer will be unavailable. bpf_kptr_xchg() can be inlined by converting the calling of bpf_kptr_xchg() into an atomic_xchg() instruction. But the conversion depends on two conditions: 1) JIT backend supports atomic_xchg() on pointer-sized word 2) For the specific arch, the implementation of xchg is the same as atomic_xchg() on pointer-sized words. It seems most 64-bit JIT backends satisfies these two conditions. But as a precaution, defining a weak function bpf_jit_supports_ptr_xchg() to state whether such conversion is safe and only supporting inline for 64-bit host. For x86-64, it supports BPF_XCHG atomic operation and both xchg() and atomic_xchg() use arch_xchg() to implement the exchange, so enabling the inline of bpf_kptr_xchg() on x86-64 first. Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240105104819.3916743-2-houtao@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
d17aff807f |
Revert BPF token-related functionality
This patch includes the following revert (one conflicting BPF FS patch and three token patch sets, represented by merge commits): - revert |
|
|
|
c49b292d03 |
netdev
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEE+soXsSLHKoYyzcli6rmadz2vbToFAmWAz2EACgkQ6rmadz2v bToqrw/9EwroZCc8GEHOKAlb/fzrMvn92rLo0ZW/cGN84QJPnx4zM6Zo0+fgLaaN oqqztwMUwdzGC3uX3FfVXaaLKbJ/MeHeL9BXFZNW8zkRHciw4R7kIBhOdPnHyET7 uT+rQ4xPe1Mt7e9PjepKlSL5mEsxWfBkdUgsdn19Z2Vjdfr9mZMhYWYMJGcfTCD1 TwxHKBPhq5fN3IsshmMBB8IrRp1HStUKb65MgZ4dI22LJXxTsFkx5XMFXcmuqvkH NhKj8jDcPEEh31bYcb6aG2Z4onw5F2lquygjk1Qyy5cyw45m/ipJKAXKdAyvJG+R VZCWOET/9wbRwFSK5wxwihCuKghFiofK52i2PcGtXZh0PCouyZZneSJOKM0yVWKO BvuJBxK4ETRnQyN6ZxhuJiEXG3/YMBBhyR2TX1LntVK9ct/k7qFVzATG49J39/sR SYMbptBRj4a5oMJ1qn0nFVEDFkg0jTnTDNnsEpcz60Ayt6EsJ1XosO5yz2huf861 xgRMTKMseyG1/uV45tQ8ZPzbSPpBxjUi9Dl3coYsIm1a+y6clWUXcarONY5KVrpS CR98DuFgl+E7dXuisd/Kz2p2KxxSPq8nytsmLlgOvrUqhwiXqB+TKN8EHgIapVOt l1A5LrzXFTcGlT9MlaWBqEIy83Bu1nqQqbxrAFOE0k8A5jomXaw= =stU2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next Alexei Starovoitov says: ==================== pull-request: bpf-next 2023-12-18 This PR is larger than usual and contains changes in various parts of the kernel. The main changes are: 1) Fix kCFI bugs in BPF, from Peter Zijlstra. End result: all forms of indirect calls from BPF into kernel and from kernel into BPF work with CFI enabled. This allows BPF to work with CONFIG_FINEIBT=y. 2) Introduce BPF token object, from Andrii Nakryiko. It adds an ability to delegate a subset of BPF features from privileged daemon (e.g., systemd) through special mount options for userns-bound BPF FS to a trusted unprivileged application. The design accommodates suggestions from Christian Brauner and Paul Moore. Example: $ sudo mkdir -p /sys/fs/bpf/token $ sudo mount -t bpf bpffs /sys/fs/bpf/token \ -o delegate_cmds=prog_load:MAP_CREATE \ -o delegate_progs=kprobe \ -o delegate_attachs=xdp 3) Various verifier improvements and fixes, from Andrii Nakryiko, Andrei Matei. - Complete precision tracking support for register spills - Fix verification of possibly-zero-sized stack accesses - Fix access to uninit stack slots - Track aligned STACK_ZERO cases as imprecise spilled registers. It improves the verifier "instructions processed" metric from single digit to 50-60% for some programs. - Fix verifier retval logic 4) Support for VLAN tag in XDP hints, from Larysa Zaremba. 5) Allocate BPF trampoline via bpf_prog_pack mechanism, from Song Liu. End result: better memory utilization and lower I$ miss for calls to BPF via BPF trampoline. 6) Fix race between BPF prog accessing inner map and parallel delete, from Hou Tao. 7) Add bpf_xdp_get_xfrm_state() kfunc, from Daniel Xu. It allows BPF interact with IPSEC infra. The intent is to support software RSS (via XDP) for the upcoming ipsec pcpu work. Experiments on AWS demonstrate single tunnel pcpu ipsec reaching line rate on 100G ENA nics. 8) Expand bpf_cgrp_storage to support cgroup1 non-attach, from Yafang Shao. 9) BPF file verification via fsverity, from Song Liu. It allows BPF progs get fsverity digest. * tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (164 commits) bpf: Ensure precise is reset to false in __mark_reg_const_zero() selftests/bpf: Add more uprobe multi fail tests bpf: Fail uprobe multi link with negative offset selftests/bpf: Test the release of map btf s390/bpf: Fix indirect trampoline generation selftests/bpf: Temporarily disable dummy_struct_ops test on s390 x86/cfi,bpf: Fix bpf_exception_cb() signature bpf: Fix dtor CFI cfi: Add CFI_NOSEAL() x86/cfi,bpf: Fix bpf_struct_ops CFI x86/cfi,bpf: Fix bpf_callback_t CFI x86/cfi,bpf: Fix BPF JIT call cfi: Flip headers selftests/bpf: Add test for abnormal cnt during multi-kprobe attachment selftests/bpf: Don't use libbpf_get_error() in kprobe_multi_test selftests/bpf: Add test for abnormal cnt during multi-uprobe attachment bpf: Limit the number of kprobes when attaching program to multiple kprobes bpf: Limit the number of uprobes when attaching program to multiple uprobes bpf: xdp: Register generic_kfunc_set with XDP programs selftests/bpf: utilize string values for delegate_xxx mount options ... ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231219000520.34178-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
4f9087f166 |
x86/cfi,bpf: Fix BPF JIT call
The current BPF call convention is __nocfi, except when it calls !JIT things, then it calls regular C functions. It so happens that with FineIBT the __nocfi and C calling conventions are incompatible. Specifically __nocfi will call at func+0, while FineIBT will have endbr-poison there, which is not a valid indirect target. Causing #CP. Notably this only triggers on IBT enabled hardware, which is probably why this hasn't been reported (also, most people will have JIT on anyway). Implement proper CFI prologues for the BPF JIT codegen and drop __nocfi for x86. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231215092707.345270396@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
f08a1c6582 |
bpf: Let bpf_prog_pack_free handle any pointer
Currently, bpf_prog_pack_free only can only free pointer to struct bpf_binary_header, which is not flexible. Add a size argument to bpf_prog_pack_free so that it can handle any pointer. Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> # on s390x Reviewed-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231206224054.492250-2-song@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
8062fb12de |
bpf: consistently use BPF token throughout BPF verifier logic
Remove remaining direct queries to perfmon_capable() and bpf_capable() in BPF verifier logic and instead use BPF token (if available) to make decisions about privileges. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130185229.2688956-9-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
e1cef620f5 |
bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command
Add basic support of BPF token to BPF_PROG_LOAD. Wire through a set of allowed BPF program types and attach types, derived from BPF FS at BPF token creation time. Then make sure we perform bpf_token_capable() checks everywhere where it's relevant. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130185229.2688956-7-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
|
|
|
af66bfd3c8 |
bpf: Optimize the free of inner map
When removing the inner map from the outer map, the inner map will be freed after one RCU grace period and one RCU tasks trace grace period, so it is certain that the bpf program, which may access the inner map, has exited before the inner map is freed. However there is no need to wait for one RCU tasks trace grace period if the outer map is only accessed by non-sleepable program. So adding sleepable_refcnt in bpf_map and increasing sleepable_refcnt when adding the outer map into env->used_maps for sleepable program. Although the max number of bpf program is INT_MAX - 1, the number of bpf programs which are being loaded may be greater than INT_MAX, so using atomic64_t instead of atomic_t for sleepable_refcnt. When removing the inner map from the outer map, using sleepable_refcnt to decide whether or not a RCU tasks trace grace period is needed before freeing the inner map. Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204140425.1480317-6-houtao@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |