Turn dentry->d_name into an anon union of const struct qsrt (d_name
itself) and a writable alias (__d_name). With constification of some
struct qstr * arguments of functions that get &dentry->d_name passed
to them, that ends up with all modifications provably done only in
fs/dcache.c (and a fairly small part of it).
Any new places doing modifications will be easy to find - grep for
__d_name will suffice.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Merge tag 'pull-qstr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull d_name audit update from Al Viro:
"Simplifying ->d_name audits, easy part.
Turn dentry->d_name into an anon union of const struct qsrt (d_name
itself) and a writable alias (__d_name).
With constification of some struct qstr * arguments of functions that
get &dentry->d_name passed to them, that ends up with all
modifications provably done only in fs/dcache.c (and a fairly small
part of it).
Any new places doing modifications will be easy to find - grep for
__d_name will suffice"
* tag 'pull-qstr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
make it easier to catch those who try to modify ->d_name
generic_ci_validate_strict_name(): constify name argument
afs_dir_search: constify qstr argument
afs_edit_dir_{add,remove}(): constify qstr argument
exfat_find(): constify qstr argument
security_dentry_init_security(): constify qstr argument
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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20250926' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Move the management of the LSM BPF security blobs into the framework
In order to enable multiple LSMs we need to allocate and free the
various security blobs in the LSM framework and not the individual
LSMs as they would end up stepping all over each other.
- Leverage the lsm_bdev_alloc() helper in lsm_bdev_alloc()
Make better use of our existing helper functions to reduce some code
duplication.
- Update the Rust cred code to use 'sync::aref'
Part of a larger effort to move the Rust code over to the 'sync'
module.
- Make CONFIG_LSM dependent on CONFIG_SECURITY
As the CONFIG_LSM Kconfig setting is an ordered list of the LSMs to
enable a boot, it obviously doesn't make much sense to enable this
when CONFIG_SECURITY is disabled.
- Update the LSM and CREDENTIALS sections in MAINTAINERS with Rusty
bits
Add the Rust helper files to the associated LSM and CREDENTIALS
entries int the MAINTAINERS file. We're trying to improve the
communication between the two groups and making sure we're all aware
of what is going on via cross-posting to the relevant lists is a good
way to start.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20250926' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lsm: CONFIG_LSM can depend on CONFIG_SECURITY
MAINTAINERS: add the associated Rust helper to the CREDENTIALS section
MAINTAINERS: add the associated Rust helper to the LSM section
rust,cred: update AlwaysRefCounted import to sync::aref
security: use umax() to improve code
lsm,selinux: Add LSM blob support for BPF objects
lsm: use lsm_blob_alloc() in lsm_bdev_alloc()
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20250926' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
- Proper audit support for multiple LSMs
As the audit subsystem predated the work to enable multiple LSMs,
some additional work was needed to support logging the different LSM
labels for the subjects/tasks and objects on the system. Casey's
patches add new auxillary records for subjects and objects that
convey the additional labels.
- Ensure fanotify audit events are always generated
Generally speaking security relevant subsystems always generate audit
events, unless explicitly ignored. However, up to this point fanotify
events had been ignored by default, but starting with this pull
request fanotify follows convention and generates audit events by
default.
- Replace an instance of strcpy() with strscpy()
- Minor indentation, style, and comment fixes
* tag 'audit-pr-20250926' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: fix skb leak when audit rate limit is exceeded
audit: init ab->skb_list earlier in audit_buffer_alloc()
audit: add record for multiple object contexts
audit: add record for multiple task security contexts
lsm: security_lsmblob_to_secctx module selection
audit: create audit_stamp structure
audit: add a missing tab
audit: record fanotify event regardless of presence of rules
audit: fix typo in auditfilter.c comment
audit: Replace deprecated strcpy() with strscpy()
audit: fix indentation in audit_log_exit()
Nothing outside of fs/dcache.c has any business modifying
dentry names; passing &dentry->d_name as an argument should
have that argument declared as a const pointer.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> # smack part
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
With the introduction of clone3 in commit 7f192e3cd3 ("fork: add
clone3") the effective bit width of clone_flags on all architectures was
increased from 32-bit to 64-bit, with a new type of u64 for the flags.
However, for most consumers of clone_flags the interface was not
changed from the previous type of unsigned long.
While this works fine as long as none of the new 64-bit flag bits
(CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND and CLONE_INTO_CGROUP) are evaluated, this is still
undesirable in terms of the principle of least surprise.
Thus, this commit fixes all relevant interfaces of callees to
sys_clone3/copy_process (excluding the architecture-specific
copy_thread) to consistently pass clone_flags as u64, so that
no truncation to 32-bit integers occurs on 32-bit architectures.
Signed-off-by: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250901-nios2-implement-clone3-v2-2-53fcf5577d57@siemens-energy.com
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Add a parameter lsmid to security_lsmblob_to_secctx() to identify which
of the security modules that may be active should provide the security
context. If the value of lsmid is LSM_ID_UNDEF the first LSM providing
a hook is used. security_secid_to_secctx() is unchanged, and will
always report the first LSM providing a hook.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subj tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch introduces LSM blob support for BPF maps, programs, and
tokens to enable LSM stacking and multiplexing of LSM modules that
govern BPF objects. Additionally, the existing BPF hooks used by
SELinux have been updated to utilize the new blob infrastructure,
removing the assumption of exclusive ownership of the security
pointer.
Signed-off-by: Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: dropped local variable init, style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Convert the lsm_bdev_alloc() function to use the lsm_blob_alloc() helper
like all of the other LSM security blob allocators.
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20250725' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Add Nicolas Bouchinet and Xiu Jianfeng as Lockdown maintainers
The Lockdown LSM has been without a dedicated mantainer since its
original acceptance upstream, and it has suffered as a result.
Thankfully we have two new volunteers who together I believe have the
background and desire to help ensure Lockdown is properly supported.
- Remove the unused cap_mmap_file() declaration
* tag 'lsm-pr-20250725' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
MAINTAINERS: Add Xiu and myself as Lockdown maintainers
security: Remove unused declaration cap_mmap_file()
lsm: trivial comment fix
Now that we expose struct file_attr as our uapi struct rename all the
internal struct to struct file_kattr to clearly communicate that it is a
kernel internal struct. This is similar to struct mount_{k}attr and
others.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250703-restlaufzeit-baurecht-9ed44552b481@brauner
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Introduce new hooks for setting and getting filesystem extended
attributes on inode (FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR).
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250630-xattrat-syscall-v6-2-c4e3bc35227b@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Fix a typo in the security_inode_mkdir() comment block.
Signed-off-by: Kalevi Kolttonen <kalevi@kolttonen.fi>
[PM: subject tweak, add description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
security_netlink_send() is a networking hook, so it fits better under
CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK.
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'bpf-next-6.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Pull bpf updates from Alexei Starovoitov:
"For this merge window we're splitting BPF pull request into three for
higher visibility: main changes, res_spin_lock, try_alloc_pages.
These are the main BPF changes:
- Add DFA-based live registers analysis to improve verification of
programs with loops (Eduard Zingerman)
- Introduce load_acquire and store_release BPF instructions and add
x86, arm64 JIT support (Peilin Ye)
- Fix loop detection logic in the verifier (Eduard Zingerman)
- Drop unnecesary lock in bpf_map_inc_not_zero() (Eric Dumazet)
- Add kfunc for populating cpumask bits (Emil Tsalapatis)
- Convert various shell based tests to selftests/bpf/test_progs
format (Bastien Curutchet)
- Allow passing referenced kptrs into struct_ops callbacks (Amery
Hung)
- Add a flag to LSM bpf hook to facilitate bpf program signing
(Blaise Boscaccy)
- Track arena arguments in kfuncs (Ihor Solodrai)
- Add copy_remote_vm_str() helper for reading strings from remote VM
and bpf_copy_from_user_task_str() kfunc (Jordan Rome)
- Add support for timed may_goto instruction (Kumar Kartikeya
Dwivedi)
- Allow bpf_get_netns_cookie() int cgroup_skb programs (Mahe Tardy)
- Reduce bpf_cgrp_storage_busy false positives when accessing cgroup
local storage (Martin KaFai Lau)
- Introduce bpf_dynptr_copy() kfunc (Mykyta Yatsenko)
- Allow retrieving BTF data with BTF token (Mykyta Yatsenko)
- Add BPF kfuncs to set and get xattrs with 'security.bpf.' prefix
(Song Liu)
- Reject attaching programs to noreturn functions (Yafang Shao)
- Introduce pre-order traversal of cgroup bpf programs (Yonghong
Song)"
* tag 'bpf-next-6.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (186 commits)
selftests/bpf: Add selftests for load-acquire/store-release when register number is invalid
bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read in check_atomic_load/store()
libbpf: Add namespace for errstr making it libbpf_errstr
bpf: Add struct_ops context information to struct bpf_prog_aux
selftests/bpf: Sanitize pointer prior fclose()
selftests/bpf: Migrate test_xdp_vlan.sh into test_progs
selftests/bpf: test_xdp_vlan: Rename BPF sections
bpf: clarify a misleading verifier error message
selftests/bpf: Add selftest for attaching fexit to __noreturn functions
bpf: Reject attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn functions
bpf: Only fails the busy counter check in bpf_cgrp_storage_get if it creates storage
bpf: Make perf_event_read_output accessible in all program types.
bpftool: Using the right format specifiers
bpftool: Add -Wformat-signedness flag to detect format errors
selftests/bpf: Test freplace from user namespace
libbpf: Pass BPF token from find_prog_btf_id to BPF_BTF_GET_FD_BY_ID
bpf: Return prog btf_id without capable check
bpf: BPF token support for BPF_BTF_GET_FD_BY_ID
bpf, x86: Fix objtool warning for timed may_goto
bpf: Check map->record at the beginning of check_and_free_fields()
...
Certain bpf syscall subcommands are available for usage from both
userspace and the kernel. LSM modules or eBPF gatekeeper programs may
need to take a different course of action depending on whether or not
a BPF syscall originated from the kernel or userspace.
Additionally, some of the bpf_attr struct fields contain pointers to
arbitrary memory. Currently the functionality to determine whether or
not a pointer refers to kernel memory or userspace memory is exposed
to the bpf verifier, but that information is missing from various LSM
hooks.
Here we augment the LSM hooks to provide this data, by simply passing
a boolean flag indicating whether or not the call originated in the
kernel, in any hook that contains a bpf_attr struct that corresponds
to a subcommand that may be called from the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250310221737.821889-2-bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
It seems that the attr parameter was never been used in security
checks since it was first introduced by:
commit da97e18458 ("perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks")
so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun@huaweicloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
It is desirable to allow LSM to configure accessibility to io_uring
because it is a coarse yet very simple way to restrict access to it. So,
add an LSM for io_uring_allowed() to guard access to io_uring.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Hamza Mahfooz <hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
[PM: merge fuzz due to changes in preceding patches, subj tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
- Implement AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2) (Mickaël Salaün)
- Implement EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits
(Mickaël Salaün)
- Add selftests and samples for AT_EXECVE_CHECK (Mickaël Salaün)
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Merge tag 'AT_EXECVE_CHECK-v6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull AT_EXECVE_CHECK from Kees Cook:
- Implement AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2) (Mickaël Salaün)
- Implement EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits
(Mickaël Salaün)
- Add selftests and samples for AT_EXECVE_CHECK (Mickaël Salaün)
* tag 'AT_EXECVE_CHECK-v6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
ima: instantiate the bprm_creds_for_exec() hook
samples/check-exec: Add an enlighten "inc" interpreter and 28 tests
selftests: ktap_helpers: Fix uninitialized variable
samples/check-exec: Add set-exec
selftests/landlock: Add tests for execveat + AT_EXECVE_CHECK
selftests/exec: Add 32 tests for AT_EXECVE_CHECK and exec securebits
security: Add EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits
exec: Add a new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
In the case where rc is equal to EOPNOTSUPP it is being reassigned a
new value of zero that is never read. The following continue statement
loops back to the next iteration of the lsm_for_each_hook loop and
rc is being re-assigned a new value from the call to getselfattr.
The assignment is redundant and can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
[PM: subj tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2) to check if a file would
be allowed for execution. The main use case is for script interpreters
and dynamic linkers to check execution permission according to the
kernel's security policy. Another use case is to add context to access
logs e.g., which script (instead of interpreter) accessed a file. As
any executable code, scripts could also use this check [1].
This is different from faccessat(2) + X_OK which only checks a subset of
access rights (i.e. inode permission and mount options for regular
files), but not the full context (e.g. all LSM access checks). The main
use case for access(2) is for SUID processes to (partially) check access
on behalf of their caller. The main use case for execveat(2) +
AT_EXECVE_CHECK is to check if a script execution would be allowed,
according to all the different restrictions in place. Because the use
of AT_EXECVE_CHECK follows the exact kernel semantic as for a real
execution, user space gets the same error codes.
An interesting point of using execveat(2) instead of openat2(2) is that
it decouples the check from the enforcement. Indeed, the security check
can be logged (e.g. with audit) without blocking an execution
environment not yet ready to enforce a strict security policy.
LSMs can control or log execution requests with
security_bprm_creds_for_exec(). However, to enforce a consistent and
complete access control (e.g. on binary's dependencies) LSMs should
restrict file executability, or measure executed files, with
security_file_open() by checking file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC.
Because AT_EXECVE_CHECK is dedicated to user space interpreters, it
doesn't make sense for the kernel to parse the checked files, look for
interpreters known to the kernel (e.g. ELF, shebang), and return ENOEXEC
if the format is unknown. Because of that, security_bprm_check() is
never called when AT_EXECVE_CHECK is used.
It should be noted that script interpreters cannot directly use
execveat(2) (without this new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag) because this could
lead to unexpected behaviors e.g., `python script.sh` could lead to Bash
being executed to interpret the script. Unlike the kernel, script
interpreters may just interpret the shebang as a simple comment, which
should not change for backward compatibility reasons.
Because scripts or libraries files might not currently have the
executable permission set, or because we might want specific users to be
allowed to run arbitrary scripts, the following patch provides a dynamic
configuration mechanism with the SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and
SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits.
This is a redesign of the CLIP OS 4's O_MAYEXEC:
f5cb330d6b/1901_open_mayexec.patch
This patch has been used for more than a decade with customized script
interpreters. Some examples can be found here:
https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/search?q=O_MAYEXEC
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Link: https://docs.python.org/3/library/io.html#io.open_code [1]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212174223.389435-2-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single lsm_context
pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier along with the context
and context length. This allows security_release_secctx() to know how
to release the context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.
Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill a lsm_context
structure instead of data and length pointers. This provides
the information about which LSM created the context so that
security_release_secctx() can use the correct hook.
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
lsm_context pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
along with the context and context length. This allows
security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.
security_secid_to_secctx() and security_lsmproc_to_secctx()
will now return the length value on success instead of 0.
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak, kdoc fix, signedness fix from Dan Carpenter]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a new lsm_context data structure to hold all the information about a
"security context", including the string, its size and which LSM allocated
the string. The allocation information is necessary because LSMs have
different policies regarding the lifecycle of these strings. SELinux
allocates and destroys them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer
to an entry in a list that never goes away.
Update security_release_secctx() to use the lsm_context instead of a
(char *, len) pair. Change its callers to do likewise. The LSMs
supporting this hook have had comments added to remind the developer
that there is more work to be done.
The BPF security module provides all LSM hooks. While there has yet to
be a known instance of a BPF configuration that uses security contexts,
the possibility is real. In the existing implementation there is
potential for multiple frees in that case.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'fsnotify_for_v6.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs
Pull fsnotify updates from Jan Kara:
"A couple of smaller random fsnotify fixes"
* tag 'fsnotify_for_v6.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
fsnotify: Fix ordering of iput() and watched_objects decrement
fsnotify: fix sending inotify event with unexpected filename
fanotify: allow reporting errors on failure to open fd
fsnotify, lsm: Decouple fsnotify from lsm
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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20241112' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
"Thirteen patches, all focused on moving away from the current 'secid'
LSM identifier to a richer 'lsm_prop' structure.
This move will help reduce the translation that is necessary in many
LSMs, offering better performance, and make it easier to support
different LSMs in the future"
* tag 'lsm-pr-20241112' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lsm: remove lsm_prop scaffolding
netlabel,smack: use lsm_prop for audit data
audit: change context data from secid to lsm_prop
lsm: create new security_cred_getlsmprop LSM hook
audit: use an lsm_prop in audit_names
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_inode_getsecid
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_current_getsecid
audit: update shutdown LSM data
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_ipc_getsecid
audit: maintain an lsm_prop in audit_context
lsm: add lsmprop_to_secctx hook
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_audit_rule_match
lsm: add the lsm_prop data structure
Currently, fsnotify_open_perm() is called from security_file_open().
This is a a bit unexpected and creates otherwise unnecessary dependency
of CONFIG_FANOTIFY_ACCESS_PERMISSIONS on CONFIG_SECURITY. Fix this by
calling fsnotify_open_perm() directly.
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241013002248.3984442-1-song@kernel.org
Create a new LSM hook security_cred_getlsmprop() which, like
security_cred_getsecid(), fetches LSM specific attributes from the
cred structure. The associated data elements in the audit sub-system
are changed from a secid to a lsm_prop to accommodate multiple possible
LSM audit users.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subj line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsm_prop structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its
callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided
for IMA and audit. Change the name to security_inode_getlsmprop().
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subj line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Change the security_current_getsecid_subj() and
security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in a lsm_prop structure
instead of a u32 secid. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
possible security data for possible reporting.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data for auditing.
Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in a lsm_prop structure instead
of the u32 secid. Change the name to security_ipc_getlsmprop() to
reflect the change.
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a new hook security_lsmprop_to_secctx() and its LSM specific
implementations. The LSM specific code will use the lsm_prop element
allocated for that module. This allows for the possibility that more
than one module may be called upon to translate a secid to a string,
as can occur in the audit code.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsm_prop structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsm_prop structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsm_prop instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmprop_init()
fills the structure with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
will be converted to use the lsm_prop structure later in the series.
At that point the use of lsmprop_init() is dropped.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Patch series "remove PF_MEMALLOC_NORECLAIM" v3.
This patch (of 2):
bch2_new_inode relies on PF_MEMALLOC_NORECLAIM to try to allocate a new
inode to achieve GFP_NOWAIT semantic while holding locks. If this
allocation fails it will drop locks and use GFP_NOFS allocation context.
We would like to drop PF_MEMALLOC_NORECLAIM because it is really
dangerous to use if the caller doesn't control the full call chain with
this flag set. E.g. if any of the function down the chain needed
GFP_NOFAIL request the PF_MEMALLOC_NORECLAIM would override this and
cause unexpected failure.
While this is not the case in this particular case using the scoped gfp
semantic is not really needed bacause we can easily pus the allocation
context down the chain without too much clutter.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix kerneldoc warnings]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240926172940.167084-1-mhocko@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240926172940.167084-2-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> # For vfs changes
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge tag 'bpf-next-6.12-struct-fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Pull bpf 'struct fd' updates from Alexei Starovoitov:
"This includes struct_fd BPF changes from Al and Andrii"
* tag 'bpf-next-6.12-struct-fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next:
bpf: convert bpf_token_create() to CLASS(fd, ...)
security,bpf: constify struct path in bpf_token_create() LSM hook
bpf: more trivial fdget() conversions
bpf: trivial conversions for fdget()
bpf: switch maps to CLASS(fd, ...)
bpf: factor out fetching bpf_map from FD and adding it to used_maps list
bpf: switch fdget_raw() uses to CLASS(fd_raw, ...)
bpf: convert __bpf_prog_get() to CLASS(fd, ...)
There is no reason why struct path pointer shouldn't be const-qualified
when being passed into bpf_token_create() LSM hook. Add that const.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM/SELinux)
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Highlight that the file_set_fowner hook is now called with a lock held.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Because these are equals to MAX_LSM_COUNT. Also, we can avoid dynamic
memory allocation for ordered_lsms because MAX_LSM_COUNT is a constant.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
LSM hooks are currently invoked from a linked list as indirect calls
which are invoked using retpolines as a mitigation for speculative
attacks (Branch History / Target injection) and add extra overhead which
is especially bad in kernel hot paths:
security_file_ioctl:
0xff...0320 <+0>: endbr64
0xff...0324 <+4>: push %rbp
0xff...0325 <+5>: push %r15
0xff...0327 <+7>: push %r14
0xff...0329 <+9>: push %rbx
0xff...032a <+10>: mov %rdx,%rbx
0xff...032d <+13>: mov %esi,%ebp
0xff...032f <+15>: mov %rdi,%r14
0xff...0332 <+18>: mov $0xff...7030,%r15
0xff...0339 <+25>: mov (%r15),%r15
0xff...033c <+28>: test %r15,%r15
0xff...033f <+31>: je 0xff...0358 <security_file_ioctl+56>
0xff...0341 <+33>: mov 0x18(%r15),%r11
0xff...0345 <+37>: mov %r14,%rdi
0xff...0348 <+40>: mov %ebp,%esi
0xff...034a <+42>: mov %rbx,%rdx
0xff...034d <+45>: call 0xff...2e0 <__x86_indirect_thunk_array+352>
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Indirect calls that use retpolines leading to overhead, not just due
to extra instruction but also branch misses.
0xff...0352 <+50>: test %eax,%eax
0xff...0354 <+52>: je 0xff...0339 <security_file_ioctl+25>
0xff...0356 <+54>: jmp 0xff...035a <security_file_ioctl+58>
0xff...0358 <+56>: xor %eax,%eax
0xff...035a <+58>: pop %rbx
0xff...035b <+59>: pop %r14
0xff...035d <+61>: pop %r15
0xff...035f <+63>: pop %rbp
0xff...0360 <+64>: jmp 0xff...47c4 <__x86_return_thunk>
The indirect calls are not really needed as one knows the addresses of
enabled LSM callbacks at boot time and only the order can possibly
change at boot time with the lsm= kernel command line parameter.
An array of static calls is defined per LSM hook and the static calls
are updated at boot time once the order has been determined.
With the hook now exposed as a static call, one can see that the
retpolines are no longer there and the LSM callbacks are invoked
directly:
security_file_ioctl:
0xff...0ca0 <+0>: endbr64
0xff...0ca4 <+4>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
0xff...0ca9 <+9>: push %rbp
0xff...0caa <+10>: push %r14
0xff...0cac <+12>: push %rbx
0xff...0cad <+13>: mov %rdx,%rbx
0xff...0cb0 <+16>: mov %esi,%ebp
0xff...0cb2 <+18>: mov %rdi,%r14
0xff...0cb5 <+21>: jmp 0xff...0cc7 <security_file_ioctl+39>
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Static key enabled for SELinux
0xffffffff818f0cb7 <+23>: jmp 0xff...0cde <security_file_ioctl+62>
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Static key enabled for BPF LSM. This is something that is changed to
default to false to avoid the existing side effect issues of BPF LSM
[1] in a subsequent patch.
0xff...0cb9 <+25>: xor %eax,%eax
0xff...0cbb <+27>: xchg %ax,%ax
0xff...0cbd <+29>: pop %rbx
0xff...0cbe <+30>: pop %r14
0xff...0cc0 <+32>: pop %rbp
0xff...0cc1 <+33>: cs jmp 0xff...0000 <__x86_return_thunk>
0xff...0cc7 <+39>: endbr64
0xff...0ccb <+43>: mov %r14,%rdi
0xff...0cce <+46>: mov %ebp,%esi
0xff...0cd0 <+48>: mov %rbx,%rdx
0xff...0cd3 <+51>: call 0xff...3230 <selinux_file_ioctl>
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Direct call to SELinux.
0xff...0cd8 <+56>: test %eax,%eax
0xff...0cda <+58>: jne 0xff...0cbd <security_file_ioctl+29>
0xff...0cdc <+60>: jmp 0xff...0cb7 <security_file_ioctl+23>
0xff...0cde <+62>: endbr64
0xff...0ce2 <+66>: mov %r14,%rdi
0xff...0ce5 <+69>: mov %ebp,%esi
0xff...0ce7 <+71>: mov %rbx,%rdx
0xff...0cea <+74>: call 0xff...e220 <bpf_lsm_file_ioctl>
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Direct call to BPF LSM.
0xff...0cef <+79>: test %eax,%eax
0xff...0cf1 <+81>: jne 0xff...0cbd <security_file_ioctl+29>
0xff...0cf3 <+83>: jmp 0xff...0cb9 <security_file_ioctl+25>
0xff...0cf5 <+85>: endbr64
0xff...0cf9 <+89>: mov %r14,%rdi
0xff...0cfc <+92>: mov %ebp,%esi
0xff...0cfe <+94>: mov %rbx,%rdx
0xff...0d01 <+97>: pop %rbx
0xff...0d02 <+98>: pop %r14
0xff...0d04 <+100>: pop %rbp
0xff...0d05 <+101>: ret
0xff...0d06 <+102>: int3
0xff...0d07 <+103>: int3
0xff...0d08 <+104>: int3
0xff...0d09 <+105>: int3
While this patch uses static_branch_unlikely indicating that an LSM hook
is likely to be not present. In most cases this is still a better choice
as even when an LSM with one hook is added, empty slots are created for
all LSM hooks (especially when many LSMs that do not initialize most
hooks are present on the system).
There are some hooks that don't use the call_int_hook or
call_void_hook. These hooks are updated to use a new macro called
lsm_for_each_hook where the lsm_callback is directly invoked as an
indirect call.
Below are results of the relevant Unixbench system benchmarks with BPF LSM
and SELinux enabled with default policies enabled with and without these
patches.
Benchmark Delta(%): (+ is better)
==========================================================================
Execl Throughput +1.9356
File Write 1024 bufsize 2000 maxblocks +6.5953
Pipe Throughput +9.5499
Pipe-based Context Switching +3.0209
Process Creation +2.3246
Shell Scripts (1 concurrent) +1.4975
System Call Overhead +2.7815
System Benchmarks Index Score (Partial Only): +3.4859
In the best case, some syscalls like eventfd_create benefitted to about
~10%.
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch introduces a new hook to save inode's integrity
data. For example, for fsverity enabled files, LSMs can use this hook to
save the existence of verified fsverity builtin signature into the inode's
security blob, and LSMs can make access decisions based on this data.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak, removed changelog]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Allows author of IPE policy to indicate trust for a singular dm-verity
volume, identified by roothash, through "dmverity_roothash" and all
signed and validated dm-verity volumes, through "dmverity_signature".
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: fixed some line length issues in the comments]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch introduces a new LSM blob to the block_device structure,
enabling the security subsystem to store security-sensitive data related
to block devices. Currently, for a device mapper's mapped device containing
a dm-verity target, critical security information such as the roothash and
its signing state are not readily accessible. Specifically, while the
dm-verity volume creation process passes the dm-verity roothash and its
signature from userspace to the kernel, the roothash is stored privately
within the dm-verity target, and its signature is discarded
post-verification. This makes it extremely hard for the security subsystem
to utilize these data.
With the addition of the LSM blob to the block_device structure, the
security subsystem can now retain and manage important security metadata
such as the roothash and the signing state of a dm-verity by storing them
inside the blob. Access decisions can then be based on these stored data.
The implementation follows the same approach used for security blobs in
other structures like struct file, struct inode, and struct superblock.
The initialization of the security blob occurs after the creation of the
struct block_device, performed by the security subsystem. Similarly, the
security blob is freed by the security subsystem before the struct
block_device is deallocated or freed.
This patch also introduces a new hook security_bdev_setintegrity() to save
block device's integrity data to the new LSM blob. For example, for
dm-verity, it can use this hook to expose its roothash and signing state
to LSMs, then LSMs can save these data into the LSM blob.
Please note that the new hook should be invoked every time the security
information is updated to keep these data current. For example, in
dm-verity, if the mapping table is reloaded and configured to use a
different dm-verity target with a new roothash and signing information,
the previously stored data in the LSM blob will become obsolete. It is
crucial to re-invoke the hook to refresh these data and ensure they are up
to date. This necessity arises from the design of device-mapper, where a
device-mapper device is first created, and then targets are subsequently
loaded into it. These targets can be modified multiple times during the
device's lifetime. Therefore, while the LSM blob is allocated during the
creation of the block device, its actual contents are not initialized at
this stage and can change substantially over time. This includes
alterations from data that the LSM 'trusts' to those it does not, making
it essential to handle these changes correctly. Failure to address this
dynamic aspect could potentially allow for bypassing LSM checks.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: merge fuzz, subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch introduces a new hook to notify security system that the
content of initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs.
Upon receiving this notification, the security system can activate
a policy to allow only files that originated from the initramfs to
execute or load into kernel during the early stages of booting.
This approach is crucial for minimizing the attack surface by
ensuring that only trusted files from the initramfs are operational
in the critical boot phase.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) is an LSM that provides an
complimentary approach to Mandatory Access Control than existing LSMs
today.
Existing LSMs have centered around the concept of access to a resource
should be controlled by the current user's credentials. IPE's approach,
is that access to a resource should be controlled by the system's trust
of a current resource.
The basis of this approach is defining a global policy to specify which
resource can be trusted.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The LSM framework has an existing inode_free_security() hook which
is used by LSMs that manage state associated with an inode, but
due to the use of RCU to protect the inode, special care must be
taken to ensure that the LSMs do not fully release the inode state
until it is safe from a RCU perspective.
This patch implements a new inode_free_security_rcu() implementation
hook which is called when it is safe to free the LSM's internal inode
state. Unfortunately, this new hook does not have access to the inode
itself as it may already be released, so the existing
inode_free_security() hook is retained for those LSMs which require
access to the inode.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+5446fbf332b0602ede0b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/00000000000076ba3b0617f65cc8@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Some cleanup and style corrections for lsm_hooks.h.
* Drop the lsm_inode_alloc() extern declaration, it is not needed.
* Relocate lsm_get_xattr_slot() and extern variables in the file to
improve grouping of related objects.
* Don't use tabs to needlessly align structure fields.
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To be consistent with most LSM hooks, convert the return value of
hook inode_copy_up_xattr to 0 or a negative error code.
Before:
- Hook inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 when accepting xattr, 1 when
discarding xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know xattr, or any
other negative error code otherwise.
After:
- Hook inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 when accepting xattr, *-ECANCELED*
when discarding xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know xattr, or
any other negative error code otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To be consistent with most LSM hooks, convert the return value of
hook vm_enough_memory to 0 or a negative error code.
Before:
- Hook vm_enough_memory returns 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not.
- LSM_RET_DEFAULT(vm_enough_memory_mm) is 1.
After:
- Hook vm_enough_memory reutrns 0 if permission is granted, negative
error code if not.
- LSM_RET_DEFAULT(vm_enough_memory_mm) is 0.
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Move management of the perf_event->security blob out of the individual
security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of
allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the
infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated
there. There are no longer any modules that require the perf_event_free()
hook. The hook definition has been removed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Move management of the infiniband security blob out of the individual
security modules and into the LSM infrastructure. The security modules
tell the infrastructure how much space they require at initialization.
There are no longer any modules that require the ib_free() hook.
The hook definition has been removed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[PM: subject tweak, selinux style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Linus Torvalds
Al Viro
Simon Schuster
Casey Schaufler
Blaise Boscaccy
Paul Moore
Christian Brauner
Andrey Albershteyn
Kalevi Kolttonen
Song Liu
Luo Gengkun
Hamza Mahfooz
Colin Ian King
Mickaël Salaün
Michal Hocko
Andrii Nakryiko
Tetsuo Handa
KP Singh
Fan Wu
Deven Bowers
Xu Kuohai