mirror of https://github.com/torvalds/linux.git
x86/bugs: Get rid of the forward declarations
Get rid of the forward declarations of the mitigation functions by moving their single caller below them. No functional changes. Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251105200447.GBaQut3w4dLilZrX-z@fat_crate.local
This commit is contained in:
Borislav Petkov (AMD)
parent
e9cc99142a
commit
e67997021f
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@ -53,53 +53,6 @@
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* mitigation option.
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* mitigation option.
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*/
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*/
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static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
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static void __init spectre_v1_apply_mitigation(void);
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static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
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static void __init spectre_v2_update_mitigation(void);
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static void __init spectre_v2_apply_mitigation(void);
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static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
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static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void);
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static void __init retbleed_apply_mitigation(void);
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static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void);
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static void __init spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation(void);
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static void __init spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation(void);
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static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
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static void __init ssb_apply_mitigation(void);
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static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
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static void __init l1tf_apply_mitigation(void);
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static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
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static void __init mds_update_mitigation(void);
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static void __init mds_apply_mitigation(void);
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static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
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static void __init taa_update_mitigation(void);
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static void __init taa_apply_mitigation(void);
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static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
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static void __init mmio_update_mitigation(void);
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static void __init mmio_apply_mitigation(void);
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static void __init rfds_select_mitigation(void);
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static void __init rfds_update_mitigation(void);
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static void __init rfds_apply_mitigation(void);
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static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
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static void __init srbds_apply_mitigation(void);
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static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
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static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void);
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static void __init srso_update_mitigation(void);
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static void __init srso_apply_mitigation(void);
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static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
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static void __init gds_apply_mitigation(void);
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static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void);
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static void __init bhi_update_mitigation(void);
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static void __init bhi_apply_mitigation(void);
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static void __init its_select_mitigation(void);
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static void __init its_update_mitigation(void);
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static void __init its_apply_mitigation(void);
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static void __init tsa_select_mitigation(void);
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static void __init tsa_apply_mitigation(void);
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static void __init vmscape_select_mitigation(void);
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static void __init vmscape_update_mitigation(void);
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static void __init vmscape_apply_mitigation(void);
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/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
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/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
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u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
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u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
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@ -233,99 +186,6 @@ static void __init cpu_print_attack_vectors(void)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
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{
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/*
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* Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
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* have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
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* init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
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*/
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if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
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rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
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/*
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* Previously running kernel (kexec), may have some controls
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* turned ON. Clear them and let the mitigations setup below
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* rediscover them based on configuration.
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*/
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x86_spec_ctrl_base &= ~SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK;
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}
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x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
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cpu_print_attack_vectors();
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/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
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spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
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spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
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retbleed_select_mitigation();
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spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation();
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ssb_select_mitigation();
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l1tf_select_mitigation();
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mds_select_mitigation();
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taa_select_mitigation();
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mmio_select_mitigation();
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rfds_select_mitigation();
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srbds_select_mitigation();
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l1d_flush_select_mitigation();
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srso_select_mitigation();
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gds_select_mitigation();
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its_select_mitigation();
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bhi_select_mitigation();
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tsa_select_mitigation();
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vmscape_select_mitigation();
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/*
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* After mitigations are selected, some may need to update their
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* choices.
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*/
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spectre_v2_update_mitigation();
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/*
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* retbleed_update_mitigation() relies on the state set by
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* spectre_v2_update_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about
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* spectre_v2=ibrs.
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*/
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retbleed_update_mitigation();
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/*
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* its_update_mitigation() depends on spectre_v2_update_mitigation()
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* and retbleed_update_mitigation().
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*/
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its_update_mitigation();
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/*
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* spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation() depends on
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* retbleed_update_mitigation(), specifically the STIBP
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* selection is forced for UNRET or IBPB.
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*/
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spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation();
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mds_update_mitigation();
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taa_update_mitigation();
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mmio_update_mitigation();
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rfds_update_mitigation();
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bhi_update_mitigation();
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/* srso_update_mitigation() depends on retbleed_update_mitigation(). */
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srso_update_mitigation();
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vmscape_update_mitigation();
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spectre_v1_apply_mitigation();
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spectre_v2_apply_mitigation();
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retbleed_apply_mitigation();
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spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation();
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ssb_apply_mitigation();
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l1tf_apply_mitigation();
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mds_apply_mitigation();
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taa_apply_mitigation();
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mmio_apply_mitigation();
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rfds_apply_mitigation();
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srbds_apply_mitigation();
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srso_apply_mitigation();
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gds_apply_mitigation();
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its_apply_mitigation();
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bhi_apply_mitigation();
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tsa_apply_mitigation();
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vmscape_apply_mitigation();
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}
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/*
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/*
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* NOTE: This function is *only* called for SVM, since Intel uses
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* NOTE: This function is *only* called for SVM, since Intel uses
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* MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for SSBD.
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* MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for SSBD.
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@ -3376,6 +3236,99 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
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mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
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mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
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}
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}
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void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
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{
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/*
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* Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
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* have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
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* init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
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*/
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if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
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rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
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/*
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* Previously running kernel (kexec), may have some controls
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* turned ON. Clear them and let the mitigations setup below
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* rediscover them based on configuration.
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*/
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x86_spec_ctrl_base &= ~SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK;
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}
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x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
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cpu_print_attack_vectors();
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/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
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spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
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spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
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retbleed_select_mitigation();
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spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation();
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ssb_select_mitigation();
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l1tf_select_mitigation();
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mds_select_mitigation();
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taa_select_mitigation();
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mmio_select_mitigation();
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rfds_select_mitigation();
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srbds_select_mitigation();
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l1d_flush_select_mitigation();
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srso_select_mitigation();
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gds_select_mitigation();
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its_select_mitigation();
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bhi_select_mitigation();
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tsa_select_mitigation();
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vmscape_select_mitigation();
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/*
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* After mitigations are selected, some may need to update their
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* choices.
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*/
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spectre_v2_update_mitigation();
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/*
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* retbleed_update_mitigation() relies on the state set by
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* spectre_v2_update_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about
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* spectre_v2=ibrs.
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*/
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retbleed_update_mitigation();
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/*
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* its_update_mitigation() depends on spectre_v2_update_mitigation()
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* and retbleed_update_mitigation().
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*/
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its_update_mitigation();
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/*
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* spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation() depends on
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* retbleed_update_mitigation(), specifically the STIBP
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* selection is forced for UNRET or IBPB.
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*/
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spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation();
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mds_update_mitigation();
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taa_update_mitigation();
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mmio_update_mitigation();
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rfds_update_mitigation();
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bhi_update_mitigation();
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/* srso_update_mitigation() depends on retbleed_update_mitigation(). */
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srso_update_mitigation();
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vmscape_update_mitigation();
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spectre_v1_apply_mitigation();
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spectre_v2_apply_mitigation();
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retbleed_apply_mitigation();
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spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation();
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ssb_apply_mitigation();
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l1tf_apply_mitigation();
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mds_apply_mitigation();
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taa_apply_mitigation();
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mmio_apply_mitigation();
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rfds_apply_mitigation();
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srbds_apply_mitigation();
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srso_apply_mitigation();
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gds_apply_mitigation();
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its_apply_mitigation();
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bhi_apply_mitigation();
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tsa_apply_mitigation();
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vmscape_apply_mitigation();
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
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#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
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#define L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG "Mitigation: PTE Inversion"
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#define L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG "Mitigation: PTE Inversion"
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