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Hi, 

This pull request includes couple of updates for trusted keys:
 
 1. Remove duplicate 'tpm2_hash_map' and use the one in the drive via new
    function 'tpm2_find_hash_alg'.
 2. Fix a memory leak on failure paths of 'tpm2_load_cmd'.
 
 BR, Jarkko
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Merge tag 'keys-trusted-next-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd

Pull trusted key updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:

 - Remove duplicate 'tpm2_hash_map' in favor of 'tpm2_find_hash_alg()'

 - Fix a memory leak on failure paths of 'tpm2_load_cmd'

* tag 'keys-trusted-next-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
  KEYS: trusted: Fix a memory leak in tpm2_load_cmd
  KEYS: trusted: Replace a redundant instance of tpm2_hash_map
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2025-12-03 09:45:23 -08:00
parent b082c4b060 62cd5d480b
commit 7fc2cd2e4b
3 changed files with 22 additions and 22 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

14
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
View File

@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ static bool disable_pcr_integrity;
module_param(disable_pcr_integrity, bool, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(disable_pcr_integrity, "Disable integrity protection of TPM2_PCR_Extend");
static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
{HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1},
{HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256},
{HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM_ALG_SHA384},
@ -26,6 +26,18 @@ static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
{HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256},
};
int tpm2_find_hash_alg(unsigned int crypto_id)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++)
if (crypto_id == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id)
return tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id;
return -EINVAL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_find_hash_alg);
int tpm2_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
chip->timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_A);

1
include/linux/tpm.h
View File

@ -473,6 +473,7 @@ extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
extern int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *data, size_t max);
extern struct tpm_chip *tpm_default_chip(void);
void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle);
int tpm2_find_hash_alg(unsigned int crypto_id);
static inline void tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle)
{

29
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
View File

@ -18,14 +18,6 @@
#include "tpm2key.asn1.h"
static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
{HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1},
{HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256},
{HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM_ALG_SHA384},
{HASH_ALGO_SHA512, TPM_ALG_SHA512},
{HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256},
};
static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2, 23, 133, 10, 1, 5 };
static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
@ -244,20 +236,13 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
struct tpm_buf buf, sized;
int blob_len = 0;
u32 hash;
int hash;
u32 flags;
int i;
int rc;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) {
if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) {
hash = tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id;
break;
}
}
if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map))
return -EINVAL;
hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash);
if (hash < 0)
return hash;
if (!options->keyhandle)
return -EINVAL;
@ -387,6 +372,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u32 *blob_handle)
{
u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
struct tpm_buf buf;
unsigned int private_len;
unsigned int public_len;
@ -400,6 +386,9 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
/* old form */
blob = payload->blob;
payload->old_format = 1;
} else {
/* Bind for cleanup: */
blob_ref = blob;
}
/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
@ -464,8 +453,6 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
out:
if (blob != payload->blob)
kfree(blob);
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
if (rc > 0)