Hi,

This pull request includes couple of updates for trusted keys:
 
 1. Remove duplicate 'tpm2_hash_map' and use the one in the drive via new
    function 'tpm2_find_hash_alg'.
 2. Fix a memory leak on failure paths of 'tpm2_load_cmd'.
 
 BR, Jarkko
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Merge tag 'keys-trusted-next-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd

Pull trusted key updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:

 - Remove duplicate 'tpm2_hash_map' in favor of 'tpm2_find_hash_alg()'

 - Fix a memory leak on failure paths of 'tpm2_load_cmd'

* tag 'keys-trusted-next-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
  KEYS: trusted: Fix a memory leak in tpm2_load_cmd
  KEYS: trusted: Replace a redundant instance of tpm2_hash_map

drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ static bool disable_pcr_integrity;
 module_param(disable_pcr_integrity, bool, 0444);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(disable_pcr_integrity, "Disable integrity protection of TPM2_PCR_Extend");
 
-static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
+struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
 	{HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1},
 	{HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256},
 	{HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM_ALG_SHA384},
@@ -26,6 +26,18 @@ static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
 	{HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256},
 };
 
+int tpm2_find_hash_alg(unsigned int crypto_id)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++)
+		if (crypto_id == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id)
+			return tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id;
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_find_hash_alg);
+
 int tpm2_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 {
 	chip->timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_A);

include/linux/tpm.h

@@ -473,6 +473,7 @@ extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
 extern int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *data, size_t max);
 extern struct tpm_chip *tpm_default_chip(void);
 void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle);
+int tpm2_find_hash_alg(unsigned int crypto_id);
 
 static inline void tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle)
 {

security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c

@@ -18,14 +18,6 @@
 
 #include "tpm2key.asn1.h"
 
-static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
-	{HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1},
-	{HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256},
-	{HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM_ALG_SHA384},
-	{HASH_ALGO_SHA512, TPM_ALG_SHA512},
-	{HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256},
-};
-
 static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2, 23, 133, 10, 1, 5 };
 
 static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
@@ -244,20 +236,13 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 	off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
 	struct tpm_buf buf, sized;
 	int blob_len = 0;
-	u32 hash;
+	int hash;
 	u32 flags;
-	int i;
 	int rc;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) {
+	hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash);
-		if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) {
+	if (hash < 0)
-			hash = tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id;
+		return hash;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-
-	if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map))
-		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!options->keyhandle)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -387,6 +372,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 			 struct trusted_key_options *options,
 			 u32 *blob_handle)
 {
+	u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
 	struct tpm_buf buf;
 	unsigned int private_len;
 	unsigned int public_len;
@@ -400,6 +386,9 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 		/* old form */
 		blob = payload->blob;
 		payload->old_format = 1;
+	} else {
+		/* Bind for cleanup: */
+		blob_ref = blob;
 	}
 
 	/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
@@ -464,8 +453,6 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 			(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
 
 out:
-	if (blob != payload->blob)
-		kfree(blob);
 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
 
 	if (rc > 0)